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Abstract
Neustadt transformed academia’s fundamental conception of presidential leadership by
arguing that extra-constitutional resources such as strategic persuasion, public prestige,
and professional reputation are more critical to effective presidential governance than the
simple application of the president’s constitutional powers. Professional reputation,
which refers to political elites’ appraisals of the president as a leader, is a central yet
scholastically understudied pillar of Neustadt’s theory. Neustadt argued that the “echoes”
of a president’s professional reputation typically emerge from the newspaper columns of
prominent political commentators (1990, p. 53-54). In essence, newspaper columns
function as public forums where elites engage each other in interactive dialogue
regarding their assessments of presidential leadership. The president’s professional
reputation literally emerges from the give and take of those public discussions, thus the
president’s reputation can be regarded as a socially constructed concept that emanates
fundamentally from a communicative process (Denton & Hahn, 1986; Graber, 1981;
Littlejohn, 2002). The purpose of this study is to explore through qualitative methods the
opinion-editorial section of The New York Times in order to discover the thematic
structure of President George W. Bush’s professional reputation as it relates to his
stewardship of Iraq policy in the fall of 2002. In accordance to the tenets of Neustadt’s
theory, this study identified “a dominant tone, a central tendency” in elite assessments of
President Bush’s leadership on Iraq policy within the specified population of elite
writings (Neustadt, 1990, p. 53).
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Chapter 1
Introduction
On the one-year anniversary of the catastrophic terrorist attacks of September
11th, 2001, President Bush wrote an opinion-editorial entitled Securing Freedom’s
Triumph for The New York Times. In this opinion-editorial, he commemorated the
bravery exhibited by countless Americans in the face of unparalleled tragedy while
simultaneously offering a vision of how America was going to win the war on terror
(Bush, 2002c). This op-ed piece was politically significant, because it foreshadowed
many of the major ideas of his much-anticipated address to the United Nations, which
was delivered the next day. In his op-ed piece, he argued that the war on terror required
the international community to coordinate its efforts to force rogue regimes to give up
their weapons of mass destruction programs and to renounce their state sponsorship of
terrorism.
In his UN address, he quickly made it clear that Iraq was the rogue regime that he
had in mind when he wrote his op-ed piece. In the president’s view, Iraq had violated its
international commitments, reconstituted its weapons program, and assisted terrorist
networks. The president reminded his audience that the core aspiration of the architects of
the United Nations, which was founded in 1945 in the wake of humanity’s most tragic
and horrific war, was to create an institution where states could unite to solve
transnational problems through cooperative diplomatic efforts rather than resort to
divisive competition or catastrophic war. He argued that the United Nations had a historic
opportunity to realize the promise of its founding mission by being the vessel through
which the international community, as one legitimate and authoritative voice, could
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demand that Iraq comply with its international commitments once and for all or face the
righteous judgment of the international community (Bush, 2002d).
If the president’s argument had stopped here, it probably would not have been
considered historic given the fact that many nations had long supported a number of
Security Council resolutions that called for the condemnation, disarmament, and
containment of Iraq. However, the president’s words provoked considerable
consternation among some political elites in the U.S. and the international community,
because it alluded to a national security doctrine that some regarded as ominous and
potentially destabilizing for the international community. Earlier that summer in an
address to the graduating cadets at West Point, the president had forewarned the world
that the United States would, unilaterally if necessary, preempt certain threats to its
security through military action even if multilateral institutions like the United Nations
did not sanction such action (Bush, 2002b; Purdum, 2003). The less than subtle
implication of the president’s words was that the world’s most powerful nation was
publicly announcing to its international brethren that the United States would not be
constrained even on matters of war and peace by multilateral institutions like the United
Nations when it perceived that its vital interests were at stake. Despite words to the
contrary by senior administration officials like Secretary of State Colin Powell, the
president’s willingness to move from a reactive and collaborative posture to a proactive
and potentially unilateral posture represented a fundamental change of emphasis in
national security policy that had potentially revolutionary implications for the
international community (Powell, 2004). This fundamental change of emphasis in U.S.
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national security policy became commonly known as the Bush doctrine of preemption
(Purdum, 2003).
This study posits that in order for the president’s strategy of preemption to gain
legitimacy with the general public the president had to acquire a vote of confidence from
other prominent political elites regarding the president’s capacity to decipher the
appropriate circumstances and threats that warranted the launching of a preemptive war.
This judgment is based upon a central pillar of Richard Neustadt’s groundbreaking theory
regarding presidential power—professional reputation. Professional reputation argues
that appraisals of the president’s political and public policy expertise by political elites
who are defined as a unique class of individuals who do business with or closely monitor
the actions of the president significantly influence the president’s capacity to exercise
genuine leadership in a decentralized political system that forces the president to share
power with a network of semi-autonomous political actors, because those appraisals
influence the way the president’s governing partners do business with him (Gleiber,
Shull, & Waligora, 1998; Neustadt, 1990).
The idea that presidential success on major policy initiatives regarding foreign
policy requires some degree of elite support or acquiescence has been under appreciated
in part due to the influence, albeit waning, of Wildavsky’s two presidencies thesis, which
suggests that presidents have much more discretion in foreign policy than they do in
domestic policy (Lewis, 1997; Lindsay& Steger, 1993; Wildavsky, 1966). In our
constitutional system, a network of interdependent official and unofficial political actors
must come together in order to formulate, justify, ratify, and implement public policy
irrespective of its domestic or foreign domain. Nevertheless, the press and the general
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public, particularly in areas of national security and national emergency, often grant
substantial deference to the leadership of the president, when they discern that there is
widespread consensus amongst elites over the president’s policy and the president’s
management of his policy. Due to the public’s limited interest, expertise, and
independent sources of information regarding foreign policy issues, the public typically
will look through the lens of the media for cues from elites regarding the wisdom of the
president’s policy. For the public, the salience of foreign issues and the potential pitfalls
in the president’s approach to those issues increases when the press begins to highlight
conflict between elites over the wisdom of the president’s policy. Squabbling between
mainstream elites over a controversial presidential policy dramatically increases the
likelihood that the president and his policy will receive unfavorable press, which could be
a catalyst for public dissatisfaction with his policy, thus any president has a major
incentive to garner the support of the governing class when he is pursuing a controversial
policy on a major or salient issue (DeClerico, 2000; McCartney, 1994; Perloff, 1998).
As the president made the case for his policy towards Iraq during the fall of 2002,
the general public gradually was roused to become more involved in the political process,
but a number of political elites were already engaged and fully understood the gravity of
the president’s policy even its embryonic stages. Elites were the first to study and debate
the intricacies of the president’s policy as well as how shrewd the president was in the
stewardship of his policy. Many of these elite assessments were articulated,
disseminated, and debated through the opinion pages of the nation’s leading newspapers
such as The New York Times. Neustadt has argued that a president’s professional
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reputation can be discovered and measured in the opinion pages of top newspapers
(Gleiber et al., 1998; Neustadt, 1990).
The formation of a president’s professional reputation is an inherently
communicative process emanating from the rhetorical tradition, because the president’s
reputation is a socially constructed entity formed in part through strategic dialogue
among elites on the opinion pages of the nation’s leading newspapers (Littlejohn, 2002;
Neustadt, 1990). Gleiber et al. suggests that the president’s “professional reputation or
standing is an attitudinal characteristic of the attentive elite, not a characteristic of the
president himself” (1998, p. 368). This reality makes the president’s professional
reputation a receiver-based phenomenon, because the president’s professional reputation
is the collective perceptions of the president’s official and unofficial governing partners.
The reality of those collective elite perceptions literally emerges, consolidates, evolves,
erodes, and or sustains through the interactive and strategic dialogue found on the opinion
pages of the nation’s top newspapers (Littlejohn, 2002; Neustadt, 1990). Given the
interpretive, social, contextual, fluid, and rhetorical nature of the professional reputation
concept as expressed through editorial commentary, I propose to do a qualitative analysis
of the themes that emerge from political columns, editorials, and opinion-editorials
regarding the president’s professional reputation in managing his policy regarding Iraq
during the fall of 2002.
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Research Question
What are the major thematic patterns that emerge from political columns, editorials, and
opinion-editorials in The New York Times regarding President Bush’s professional
reputation as it related to the initial phase of his stewardship of U.S. policy regarding Iraq
in the fall of 2002?
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Chapter 2
Literature Review/Research Context
Theoretical Framework
Richard Neustadt in his seminal work on presidential leadership, Presidential
Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan,
introduced the idea that elite appraisals of presidential leadership establish the president’s
professional reputation, which is a core dimension of presidential power (1990). Gleiber,
Shull, & Waligora say that “professional reputation is the assessment of the president by
those upon whom he must depend for cooperation and compliance when he does not have
full power to effect political and policy goals” (1998, p. 367).
The president’s professional reputation is so critical to his effectiveness as a
leader, because in our constitutional system, he must share power with other
constitutional officers in order to govern (Neustadt, 1990). The president also must
compete with a wide array of private special interest groups for leadership over public
policy (Kernell, 1997). If the president is seen as weak or incompetent by a significant
percentage of political elites, then the likelihood that various political elites will
challenge or resist his leadership is dramatically increased (Kernell, 1997; Neustadt,
1990). A president whose leadership skills are held in low regard by his governing
partners has little chance of successfully shepherding major policy initiatives, particularly
if those initiatives are controversial.
In Neustadt’s theory of presidential power, elites are defined as individuals who
do business with the president or whose job or status requires them to closely monitor,
report, anticipate, or react to the president’s behavior (1990). These elites closely monitor
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and try to decipher the meaning and implications of the president’s communication and
behavior, because unlike many common citizens, this unique class of individuals
recognizes in a very tangible way that the president’s leadership impacts their interests.
These political elites are constantly assessing the meaning and significance of
presidential choices not only for understanding of present circumstances but also to get a
reading on how the president will act in the future. For example, if the governing elite
detect a pattern of indecisiveness or inability to recognize political opportunities, then
they might anticipate the manifestation of these weaknesses in future presidential action
and decide that the president is ripe for challenge. The better the reading they have on the
president the better they will be able to secure their interests and exercise influence
(Kernell, 1997; Neustadt, 1990).
Elites closely monitor the president for many reasons. The behavior of various
political figures is often heavily influenced by their vantage point in the political system.
The president’s elite contemporaries often, due to differences in their political station,
have interests that diverge from the president’s interests. Elites have an interest in
understanding the nature, significance, and implications of those differing interests.
Secondly, political agents operate in an environment where they must make decisions
based upon incomplete information. Political agents try to get an advantage on their
competition by securing more reliable information. Thirdly, leadership in fact is different
from leadership in form. The constitution and supplemental statutory legislation dictates
that political entities collaborate on many areas of public policy. These dictates outline a
type of power or leadership in form. However, real political power is a phenomenon that
actually decides the course of events or the resolution of a problem. The power that
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flows from leadership in fact is a finite commodity that is not easily shared, because the
advantages that one can accrue from power or leadership in fact by their very nature often
breed competition rather than collaboration amongst their suitors (Neustadt, 1990).
The mastery of this tension between collaboration and competition over political
power is an inexact science that requires an adroit awareness and sensitivity to the
potential power of strategic communication. One must remember the “politics is largely
a word game” (Graber, 1981, p.195). Communication is so central to the domain of
politics that some scholars have argued that political consciousness itself is rooted in the
manipulation of language, since language provides the means to creating a “symbolic
interpretation of the sociopolitical experience” (Denton & Hahn, 1986, p.50). Thus in a
democratic society, public discussion and debate serve as the distillation process by
which a society or a subgroup within that society discovers how best to govern itself and
how best to evaluate and relate to its leaders or members. It is through that public
discussion that a political community determines its values and how its leaders relate to
those values.
Elites have an incentive to acquire an accurate, comprehensive, and insightful
appraisal of the president. However, the perspective of any one individual regarding the
president is somewhat limited by his particular vantage point in the political system.
Thus, an individual’s perspective of the president can be broadened, enlightened, and
heavily influenced by reading or listening to the perspectives and impressions of other
governing elites. Any class of individuals or forum that can enlarge the elite community’s
“field of vision” on the president’s leadership capacity and performance will play a
pivotal role in determining how a president is perceived by his governing partners and the
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context in which a president exercises political power (Neustadt, 1990, p.53). Opinion
writers in leading newspapers, according to Neustadt, serve this vital function by
“collecting, synthesizing, and publicly reporting elite assessments” of presidential
leadership, which in turn facilitates a larger and wider public discussion among elites
regarding the president’s leadership capacities (Gleiber et al., 1998, p. 368). Richard
Neustadt (1990) writes,
But those who watch a President because their work requires it do not see only
what he chooses to disclose to them. They see some part of almost everything he
does with almost anyone, and what they cannot see they try to hear. Everything
reported in the press adds to their field of vision. . . . They ask each other
questions. They tell each other stories. They read with care the news reports, and
newsletters, and syndicated columns circulating “inside dope” drawn from men
like themselves. Theirs is a most incestuous community. In consequence, their
outlook on a President at any given moment will be affected by impressions of his
will and skill then currently in vogue among observers like themselves. (p. 53)
Neustadt goes on to argue, “There usually is a dominant tone, a central tendency, in
Washington appraisals of a President. If one wants echoes of that tone at any one time
one reads Krock, Lippmann, Reston, Rovere, and half a dozen others” [these are
examples of political columnists from leading newspapers like The New York Times]
(1990, p. 53-54). In the final analysis, elite judgments regarding the success, failure, and
reputation of presidents are largely dependent upon the perceptions of other elite
Washingtonians. These perceptions are engineered in part by strategic communication
from political columnists (Neustadt, 1990).
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Neustadt’s rich description concerning the formation of a president’s reputation
clearly indicates that this is a communicative process, because the reality of the
president’s standing within elite circles in Washington is dictated at least in part by the
“collecting, synthesizing, and publicly reporting elite assessments” by top political
columnists (Denton & Hahn, 1986; Graber, 1981; Gleiber et al., 1998, p. 368; Littlejohn,
2002). Neustadt creates the impression that the upper echelons of Washington constitute
a kind of extremely competitive special club, where the members try simultaneously to
assist each other and gain an advantage on one another by sharing their information,
knowledge, and insights regarding the expertise and demeanor of the president with
columnists who have the capacity to accentuate the importance of their comments by
disseminating them on a grand scale. Neustadt refers to these club members as the “most
incestuous community” that “ask each other questions and tell each other stories” thereby
implying that communication is a central ingredient that integrates and defines their
relationships with one another (1990, p. 53). As a result of the interdependent nature of
their power relationships with each other and the president, one would suspect that
positive and negative face concerns would factor into the strategies behind their
communicative interactions with columnists (Brown & Levinson, 1987). This study
argues that the combination of these factors clearly indicates that any analysis of the
thematic structure of a president’s professional reputation would benefit from a distinctly
communicative perspective.
The role and potential power of political columnists is due to several factors. For
one, the high stature of political columnists within the Washington community gives
them unique access to the sentiments and the behind the scenes maneuverings of
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Washington’s powerbrokers. This insider access allows these columnists to establish a
vast network of important contacts (Grossman & Kumar, 1981). Political insiders value
the information that opinion writers obtain through their vast networks of important
contacts. They often believe that the interpretations of president performance revealed in
these opinion-editorials can assist them in protecting their own interests as they do
business with the president (Neustadt, 1990). Some political powerbrokers, including the
president, will go as far as to court columnists in an effort influence the content of their
influential writings (Grossman & Kumar, 1981).
Subsequent scholars have built upon Neustadt’s idea that the professional
reputation of the president can be discovered and measured in the writings of influential
political columnists by utilizing editorials as an indicator of elite assessments of
presidential leadership. Gleiber et al. (1998) justify this extension of this particular
operationalization of the professional reputation concept by arguing,
Editorials articulate the opinions of the newspaper but have the same function as
nationally syndicated political columns. It is job of the editorialist to formulate
and articulate opinions that reflect what columnists are writing at the time. The
editorial page is meant to be evaluative. Thus, editorialists perform the
information gathering and reporting functions identified by Neustadt. The
editorial page is meant to balance political and ideological perspectives, but,
unlike the reporting sections of the newspaper, no claim of journalistic objectivity
is made. (p. 370)
Political insiders also see these opinion pages as public forums where political
insiders can directly influence their colleagues’ as well as the general public’s
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perceptions of the president by authoring their own opinion-editorials. With opinioneditorials, political elites can bypass journalistic gatekeepers like political columnists and
editorial writers. The inclusion of opinion-editorials into the analysis of professional
reputation makes the analysis of professional reputation less of an “echo” and more of a
direct representation of elite appraisals of a president.
The great diversity in ideology, experience, loyalties, resources, and interests
found in the opinion section of top newspapers often results in a wide spectrum of
opinion regarding the status of the president’s professional reputation. For the majority of
political insiders, the range of opinion regarding the president’s professional reputation is
resolved by looking for overarching themes or a “dominant tone” in the aggregation of
those individual assessments (Neustadt, 1990, p. 53).

As a result of these factors, the

president’s professional reputation can be operationalized as editorial commentary in elite
newspapers (Gleiber et al., 1998; Neustadt, 1990).
Empirical Research On Professional Reputation
Empirical research using political commentary as a measure of a president’s
professional reputation is quite sparse. A review of the literature revealed only two
articles that have used opinion pieces from the media in their analysis of Neustadt’s
professional reputation concept (Gleiber et al., 1998; Lockerbie & Borrelli, 1989).
Lockerbie and Borrelli wanted to examine how perceptions of presidential skill
impacted presidential success in Congress (1989). To assess this phenomenon, these
researchers created a formula that included three main components- professional
reputation, congressional roll call votes on domestic policy, and a state of the economy
index. They measured the presidential reputations of President Carter and President

14
Reagan by doing a “content analysis of political columns appearing in Newsweek by
George Will and Meg Greenfield, whose commentaries also appear in the influential
Washington Post” (1989, p. 99). The researchers selected columns that were
“contemporaneous with the roll calls which will serve as our measures of presidential
influence in Congress, so information regarding skill that was unavailable to
Congressmen at the time of voting will not bias the measure” [authors noted that many
assessments of presidential reputation are flawed indicators of presidential influence,
because they are retrospective assessments] (Lockerbie & Borrelli, 1989, p. 99). These
columns were used to identify evaluations of presidential skill rather than evaluations of
the substance of presidential policies (Lockerbie & Borelli, 1989).
The coders were instructed to score the columns according to a Likert scale that
rated assessments of presidential skill on a range from 1(lowest score for skill) to 5
(highest score for skill). If a column did not comment on presidential skill, the column
was given the neutral score of 3. The researchers argued that this choice for scoring was
defensible. If the columnist did not bother to discuss the president, then “the columnist’s
assessment of the president’s skill is not likely to be appreciably high or low during that
time period” (Lockerbie & Borelli, 1989, p. 100). The researchers attempted to validate
their ratings of columns by providing direct quotations from the sampled columns. The
critical finding of the Lockerbie and Borrelli study was that contrary to conventional
wisdom “extraordinary displays of skill can prevail over contextual factors” (1989, p.
106).
Gleiber, Shull, & Waligora (1998) explored professional reputation by reviewing
3,594 editorials and opinion-editorials in The New York Times from 1961 to 1992. These
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researchers attempted to distinguish their research from the Lockerbie and Borrelli study
by arguing that Lockerbie and Borelli wrongly conceptualized professional reputation as
elite reactions to actual demonstrations of presidential skill. Gleiber et al. argued,
“Reputation may be function of, but is not, skill as identified by Lockerbie and Borrelli. .
. . What a president actually does is less important than how he is perceived by the
Washington community” (1998, p. 367). Thus, “professional reputation is an attitudinal
characteristic of the attentive elite, not a characteristic of the president himself” (Gleiber
et al., 1998, p. 368).
One of the things that Gleiber et al. wanted to discover was how professional
reputation interacted with popular prestige, which refers to the general public’s appraisals
of the president (Neustadt, 1990). They discovered that elite opinion is not heavily
influenced by mass opinion (Gleiber et al., 1998).
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Chapter 3
Political Communication Perspective
Some might question the appropriateness of applying a communication
perspective to Neustadt’s theory of presidential power given the fact that Neustadt was a
political scientist who believed that proper recognition of the interdependent yet
divergent institutional interests, relationships, and prerogatives between the president and
his governing partners was the key to understanding and predicting the bargaining
maneuvers of presidents as they exercised power (Kernell, 1997). The meaning of those
interdependent yet divergent institutional interests, relationships, and prerogatives that
were the focus of Neustadt’s attention, at any given time, is determined by the
surrounding political context, which is typically defined in large part by the
communications transmitted by the key political constituencies that make up and or
dominate that political context (Denton & Hahn, 1986). In an article entitled Political
Communication Faces the 21st Century, Doris Graber and James M. Smith say, “The
field of political communication . . . encompasses the construction, sending, receiving,
and processing of messages that potentially have a significant direct or indirect impact on
politics” (2005, p. 479). Based upon an analysis of the explanation offered by Neustadt
himself, one can reasonably contend that the communication process itself amongst a
select group of political elites is the central and defining element in the formation of
presidential reputation. The so-called “reality” of the president’s professional reputation
at any given time “arises from the shared perceptions created when people [in the case of
presidential professional reputation, these people are predominately political elites who
author or contribute to political commentary in the nation’s top newspapers]
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communicate with each other” (Graber & Smith, 2005, p. 490; Neustadt, 1990). Thus, a
strong argument can be made that professional reputation can best be studied within the
“interpretist or constructionist” domains of political communication (Graber & Smith,
2005, p. 490).
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Chapter 4
Methodological Approach
Since it is appropriate to research the professional reputation concept within the
“interpretist and constructionist” domains of political communication, one could
justifiably argue for the application of a qualitative methodological approach (Graber &
Smith, 2005, p. 490). The basic objective of qualitative research in the discipline of
communication is to achieve a contextual understanding of a given communicative
phenomenon from the perspective and interpretation of the phenomenon’s participants
(Guba, 1990). Contextual understanding is a key element of the aforementioned
definition. Context refers to “the conditional background or situation in which the event
is embedded” (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 106). Qualitative research emanates from a
perspective that argues that the reality and meaning of any given communicative
phenomenon is a social construction that is shaped in part by its contextual surroundings,
and thus any analysis of the meaning of any given communicative phenomenon must
incorporate the context in which the communicative phenomenon “is embedded” in order
to have the potential of producing comprehensive understanding regarding the specified
phenomenon (Guba, 1990; Strauss & Corbin, 1998). Professional reputation being an
aggregation of multiple, contextual, hermeneutical, and fluid elite interpretations of
presidential expertise makes this concept ideally suited for qualitative research.
This author agrees with Gleiber et al. who argue that “professional reputation is
an attitudinal characteristic of the attentive elite” (1998, p. 368). If we are truly
interested in getting an accurate reading of how elites perceive the president, then we
need to use research methods that allow those interpretations to emerge from the data
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provided by the participants. We do not want the researcher to impose his or her
interpretations on data. Qualitative research is designed to fulfill that purpose (Maxwell,
1996).
Our understanding of the nature of professional reputation and its impact upon
presidential leadership is limited, because only a handful of scholars have attempted to
explore and clarify the meaning of Neustadt’s concept in their research (Gleiber et al.,
1998; Lockerbie & Borrelli, 1989). One could argue that identifying the thematic
structure of professional reputation in a case study example could enhance our
understanding of this dimension of presidential power.
Elites Operationalized
Neustadt argues that the professional reputation of a president encompasses the
collective perceptions and appraisals of elites regarding a president’s acumen in
policymaking and political strategizing (1990). This study proposes to examine elite
appraisals of President Bush’s handling of Iraq policy by reviewing editorials, political
columns, and opinion-editorials in The New York Times from September 11, 2002 to
November 8, 2002. The appropriateness of using editorials, opinion-editorials, and
political columns as measures of a president’s professional reputation has been
consistently defended since the founding of the professional concept and throughout its
scholastic progeny (Gleiber et al., 1998; Lockerbie & Borrelli, 1989; Neustadt, 1990).
Thus, for the purposes of this study, political elites are operationalized as individuals who
author or contribute to editorials, opinion-editorials, or political columns in The New York
Times.

20
Data Source Selected
The New York Times was selected, because this paper is widely “regarded as the
national newspaper of record” and political elites from a wide range of ideological
perspectives regularly read and contribute to the opinion section of this newspaper
(Gleiber et al., 1998, p. 370; Grossman & Kumar, 1981). Furthermore, the political
columnists cited by Neustadt in his original explication of his theory “regularly
contributed to The New York Times” (Gleiber et al., 1998, p. 370).
Political Columns, Editorials, & Opinion-editorials Operationalized
Political columns are operationalized as opinion pieces that written by columnists
who regularly contribute to the opinion section of The Times. The person who wrote the
column is clearly specified. A column represents only the opinion of the individual
columnist who wrote that particular column.
Editorials are operationalized as opinion pieces that are written by the editorial
staff of the paper. No specific name is attached to the editorial as an author, but editorials
are written with the clear understanding that they represent the subjective view of the
editorial page board.
Opinion-editorials are operationalized as opinion pieces written by prominent
citizens who have no official affiliation with The Times. These pieces are submitted to
the editorial division of the paper, and this division selects which submissions make it
into the paper. The author of the opinion-editorial is clearly specified, and the opinion in
the opinion-editorial is attributed to the individual who submitted it.
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Type Of Data Selected
Editorials, opinion-editorials, and political columns that offered an evaluative
assessment regarding the relative quality, nature, and significance of President Bush’s
stewardship of Iraq policy were selected. The goal is to select political columns,
editorials, and opinion-editorials that critique the president’s stewardship on his Iraq
policy rather than opinion pieces that simply critique the substance of his Iraq policy. In
this context, evaluative assessments can be positive, negative, or mixed characterizations
of presidential leadership. The various expressions of these evaluative assessments can
be conceptualized as existing along a thematic continuum that ranges from positive to
negative.
Furthermore, the researcher endeavors to select pieces that are predominately
focused on the president’s stewardship of U. S. policy towards Iraq rather than pieces
where the president’s management of U. S. policy towards Iraq is just one of many
concerns. The researcher also selected articles that evaluated the president’s philosophy
on national security, because a significant number of elite pieces referenced or alluded to
concepts from the Bush Doctrine in their evaluations the president’s stewardship of Iraq
policy (Purdum, 2003). The inclusion of these philosophical pieces will give the
researcher a greater contextual understanding of the themes articulated in this collection
of elite writings.
Personal Review For Data Selection
The process by which the researcher retrieved editorials, opinion-editorials, and
political columns that meet the aforementioned criteria was as follows. The researcher
personally reviewed microfilm reels of The New York Times’ opinion pieces during the
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specified period in order to determine the appropriateness of these opinion pieces for this
study rather than simply relying upon a key word or headline database search that could
miss good data due to limited or restricted access to New York Times content.
Screening Words & Phrases
The microfilm search started by looking for the any of the following words or
phrases (and their affiliates or euphemisms) in the body of the political columns,
editorials, and opinion-editorials- President, Bush, administration, Iraq, Saddam Hussein,
weapons of mass destruction, war on terror or terrorism, Al Qaeda, pre-emption, national
security, United Nations, Security Council. This collection of words and phrases was
chosen because they represent the key players and ideas in this crisis involving President
Bush’s policy towards Iraq.
Screens can add a degree of systematic rigor to a data search. Some might argue
that the aforementioned screening words and phrases will not identify every appropriate
political column, editorial or opinion-editorial that meets the criteria for this study.
However, the true test for this sampling process is not whether these screening words and
phrases identify every conceivable appropriate selection for this study. No practical
sampling design could meet this standard. Moreover, the validity and appropriateness of
any screening process rests primarily on its capacity to assemble an appropriate sample of
writings in a “systematic, explicit, and reproducible” fashion (Fink, 1998, p. 15; Sumser,
2001). As long as the analytical judgments of the screening process emanate from a
logical framework that identifies appropriate writings and allows duplication by
subsequent researchers, the screening process is valid.
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Contextual Approach To Data Selection Process
This screening process is buttressed by the fact these words and phrases were
reviewed manually with an appreciation for the textual context in which they were
embedded. This contextual skimming is labor intensive, but once again it is important to
point out that this contextual approach helps the researcher to identify good data that
otherwise would be missed by a simple and narrow key word database search.
For an example of the benefits of this contextual data selection approach, consider
how this approach can help a researcher to decipher the multiple connotative meanings
associated with words like “America.” On the surface, America is simply the name of a
country. However, America can also be euphemism for the President of the United States
when it pertains to matters of foreign policy and national security. The President of the
United States is the head of state, and as a result, he is the government official held most
responsible by the general public, political elites, and the international community for
managing the nation’s foreign affairs and national security policy. Thus, if an opinioneditorial writer has been discussing his or her critique of the president’s stewardship of
foreign policy throughout his or her opinion piece and then he or she culminates the
argument by saying something like “America must abandoned its imperialistic approach
to international problems,” one might safely infer that the writer was euphemistically
saying that the president must abandon his imperialistic approach to international
problems. Sometimes a writer might use president and America interchangeably.
Sometimes a writer will simply use the word America, but contextually the reader will
understand that writer is actually discussing the president because he or she will be
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discussing actions, policies, or pronouncements that require the initiation of or are the
responsibility of the president.
Another possible code word or indirect reference to the president would be
administration. Administration officials serve at the pleasure of the president and are
considered spokespersons for the president’s policies. One could argue that an integral
part of presidential leadership involves the management of actions and statements from
administration subordinates, because as the head of the administration, the president is
ultimately accountable for people who work and speak in his name. In short, the
behavior and rhetoric of administration personnel can be used by political elites as cues
for deciphering the nature and meaning of the leadership of a particular president as it
relates to interests of the Washington community. Since the actions and statements of
administration officials and the president’s direction or response to those behaviors can
inform elite appraisals of presidential leadership, editorial commentary regarding these
types of matters and personnel should be factored into this scholastic analysis of
President Bush’s professional reputation.
In sum, a contextual data selection process allows the researcher to recognize the
direction and meaning of subtle and connotative inferences that are being drawn from
seemingly innocuous words, phrases, and arguments. A contextual reading of the text as
a part of the initial data selection process allows the researcher to garner valuable insights
into appropriate data for this study and serves as the initial foray into the in-depth review
process that characterizes this type of qualitative research.
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Justification of Time Frame- Time Period Between Critical Events
The time period for this study falls between two critical events-the one-year
anniversary of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and the passage of the United
Nations Security Council Resolution 1441 on November 8, 2002. The justification for
the starting point of the time period starts with the fact that President Bush himself
decided on the one-year anniversary of September 11th to outline his vision for winning
the war on terror, to foreshadow his policy towards Iraq, which he unveiled in more detail
the next day in his United Nations speech, and to subtly appraise the choices and actions
of foreign leaders regarding the war on terrorism in the opinion page of The New York
Times (Bush, September 11, 2002). September 11th, 2002 marks the day that the
President launched his rhetorical campaign against Iraq. The fact that the President of the
United States used the opinion-editorial page of The New York Times to get his message
out knowing that other elites would scrutinize his words and respond to his political
choices supports Neustadt’s claim that the opinion pages of top papers are arenas where
elites engage each other on ideas and appraise presidential performance (Albright, 2002;
Rich, 2002; “Iraq Test”, 2002).
A preliminary collection of opinion pieces from The New York Times regarding
the President’s stewardship of Iraq policy during this time period suggests that
presidential action and comment regarding US policy towards Iraq played a major role in
generating opinion pieces in The New York Times. For example, The New York Times
political columnist, Nicholas Kristof, evaluates President Bush’s skill in using rhetoric
(Bush’s UN speech on September 12, 2002) to gain international support for his Iraq
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policy by comparing his actions to the maneuvering of President Kennedy at the United
Nations during the Cuban Missile Crisis (2002).
November 8, 2002 is the day that the UN Security Council made a final
ultimatum to Saddam Hussein to completely comply with an internationally sanctioned
and supervised process, which was designed to provide a thorough and complete
accounting of his weapon stockpiles, through the passage of UN Security Council
Resolution 1441. Astute observers saw the passage of Resolution 1441 as an important
turning point in the controversy (Purdum, 2003).
The time period between these critical events represented the initial phase in the
debate over the President’s stewardship of Iraq policy in the fall 2002. This initial phase
represented the period where appraisals of the president’s leadership of U.S. policy
towards Iraq were being formulated and debated in a very public and sustained way by
elites on the opinion pages of leading newspapers, and as a result, this time period
represents an excellent opportunity to study Neustadt’s professional reputations concept
within a politically and socially significant context.
Paradigmatic Perspective On Methodological Approach
The purpose of this study is to identify the major thematic patterns that emerge
from elite appraisals of President Bush’s stewardship of U.S. policy regarding Iraq as
expressed through political columns, editorials, and opinion-editorials in The New York
Times in hopes of improving our understanding of professional reputation and the
meaning of President Bush’s leadership during this controversy. Insight into what those
thematic patterns actually are can be stifled, if the researcher imposes a preexisting
analytical framework onto the text (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Taylor, 1994). The purpose
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of the study indicates that this research falls within the domain of qualitative research,
which is designed both paradigmatically and methodologically to elicit and remain true to
the interpretations of the participants who are under investigation (Guba, 1990).
Open Coding Grounded In The Data In Order To Create Thematic Categories
There often is considerable ingenuity, range, and flexibility in the coding schemes
used in qualitative research, because the qualitative researcher as methodological
instrument necessitates that some degree of subjectivity inevitably will impact the
execution of the analysis (Guba, 1990). Nevertheless in order for this research to remain
true to the mission of qualitative research, the coding scheme should be engineered
inductively through interaction with and emersion in the text (Glaser & Strauss, 1967;
Maxwell, 1996). The mission of the qualitative researcher is to establish a coding
scheme through empirical engagement with the text rather than through the application or
imposition of a preexisting coding scheme, which may or may not be well suited for the
particular contextual features of the universe of discourse under investigation (Maxwell,
1996; Patton, 1990; Taylor, 1994).
This methodological approach to data analysis is called open coding, and Strauss
and Corbin define open coding as “the analytic process through which concepts are
identified and their properties and dimensions are discovered in data” (1998, p. 101).
Open coding is a multi-step process designed to reveal the defining features of a text
within its particular contextual setting.
First, the analyst searches the text for defining objects (Strauss & Corbin, 1998).
In this study, themes constitute the objects to be discovered. It is imperative that these
themes emerge from the data in order to remain true the mission of qualitative research.
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Second, the analyst determines thematic designations on the basis of the object’s
properties and dimensions. Strauss and Corbin defined the difference between properties
and dimensions by saying, “To further clarify, whereas properties are the general or
specific characteristics or attributes of a category, dimensions represent the location of a
property along a continuum or range” (1998, p. 117). The analyst also examines the
defining properties and dimensions of discovered themes in order to conceptualize
appropriate names or categories for those discovered themes. This labeling or
conceptualizing process typically is rooted in the contextual features of the text.
In an effort to keep these thematic categories grounded in the sentiments, ideas,
and ultimate appraisals of presidential leadership expressed in these political columns,
editorials, and opinion-editorials, the researcher will make extensive use the words of the
authors themselves to explain or justify coding or analytical judgments (Strauss &
Corbin, 1998). This approach will give this study a richness that will allow the reader to
intimately appreciate the contextual interpretations that emerge from these opinion
writings. This proposal posits that this type of inductively designed thematic approach
will facilitate one’s understanding of President Bush’s professional reputation within a
specific context and “aid the development” of the professional reputation concept on a
theoretically level (Maxwell, 1996, p. 79).
Axial Coding Used To Construct Interpretive Scheme Of Data
Open coding allows the analyst to deconstruct the data into its basic or essential
elements, but in order for the analyst to get an analytic sense of the data’s meaning, the
analyst must be able “reconstruct” those elements into an “interpretive scheme” (Strauss
& Corbin, 1998, p. 65). By analytic sense, I mean a conceptual understanding of the
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data, which requires an analysis of the data that goes beyond simple description. Axial
coding is the process whereby the analyst identifies links between categories “at the level
of properties and dimensions” in order to create an interpretive scheme of the data
(Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 123). As this linking process between categories becomes
more specific and refined “along the lines of their properties and dimensions,” the analyst
might “construct” subcategories from the data in order “to form more precise and
complete explanations about the phenomena” (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 124). Strauss
& Corbin (1998) explain:
A subcategory also is a category, as it name implies. However, rather than
standing for the phenomenon itself, subcategories answer questions about the
phenomenon such as when, where, why, who, how, and with what consequences,
thus giving the concept greater explanatory power. (p. 125)
A subcategory has its own properties and dimensions, and due to the interlocking
framework of data, a subcategory can simultaneously be regarded as a property of its own
overarching theme (Strauss & Corbin, 1998).
Designating thematic categories on the basis of properties and dimensions allows
the analyst to detect patterns and variations in the data. As the analyst proceeds with his
or her analysis, he or she will compare the properties and dimensions of the new thematic
discoveries with the previous ones in order to be sensitive to appropriate delineations and
linkages between thematic categories (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Haley, 1996; Lindolf &
Taylor, 2002; Potter, 1996; Strauss & Corbin, 1998; Vidich & Lyman, 2003). This
methodological approach requires that these thematic categories be “linked, either
physically or by cross-referencing, to the data that give rise to them, in order not to lose
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the original context from which they developed, a problem often called context stripping”
(Maxwell, 1996, p. 79).
As a point of clarification, it should be noted that open and axial coding is quite
“different from coding in quantitative research, which consists of applying a
preestablished set of categories to the data according to explicit, unambiguous rules, with
the primary goal being to generate frequency counts of items in each category” (Maxwell,
1996, p. 78). Once again, the goal for open and axial coding in this proposed study is to
dissect and link the text into thematic “categories that facilitate the comparison of data
within and between these categories and that aid in the development of theoretical
concepts” (Maxwell, 1996, p. 79).
Selective Coding
Selective coding is the process by which major thematic categories based upon
the context in which they are embedded are synthesized and refined into a “constructed”
narrative in order to facilitate theory building and coherent conceptual understanding
(Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p. 145).
The goal of this research is to discover the major thematic patterns that emerge
from political columns, editorials, and opinion-editorials in The New York Times
regarding President Bush’s professional reputation as it related to the initial phase of his
stewardship of U.S. policy regarding Iraq in the fall of 2002. In the process, this research
will provide some insight into whether Neustadt was correct, at least within the context
investigated for this particular study, when he wrote, “There usually is a dominant tone, a
central tendency, in Washington appraisals of a President” (1990, p. 53-54).
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This study will follow an adapted version of Strauss and Corbin’s (1998) criteria
for determining a central category:
1. It must be central; that is, all other major categories can be related to it.
2. It must appear frequently in the data. This means that within all or almost all
cases, there are indicators pointing to that concept.
3. The explanation that evolves by relating the categories is logical and
consistent. There is no forcing of data.
4. The name or phrase used to describe the central category should be
sufficiently abstract that it can be used to do research in other substantive
areas, leading to the development of a more general theory.
5. As the concept is refined analytically through integration with other concepts,
the theory grows in depth and explanatory power. (p. 147)
Open, Axial, & Selective Coding Are Forms Of Analytic Induction
Open and axial coding essentially involves the process of analytic induction
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Haley, 1996; Lindolf & Taylor, 2002; Potter, 1996; Vidich &
Lyman, 2003). As the researcher meticulously reads each element of the text, “the
researcher asks [himself or fellow coders] if a logical connection exists between it and
any other comment or note” within that text, for his “task is take specific instances…and
demonstrate how they relate to broader concepts” (Taylor, 1994, p. 275). Analytic
induction is as much an art as it is a science, because there is no objective standard for
making these analytical judgments (Guba, 1990). Guba goes on to say that the execution
of this analytical approach will vary to some degree from researcher to researcher. The
credibility of analytical judgments derived from this methodological approach rests not
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on whether a subsequent researcher would arrive at the exact same judgments given the
same data but rather on the quality of the supporting rationale for those judgments.
Coding Memos
The coding of each political column, editorial, and opinion-editorial will be
recorded on a standardized coding memo. Each coding memo will record Type of Data
(political column, editorial, or opinion-editorial), Citation, Thematic Categories,
Properties, Dimensions, and Comments. This standardized approach will allow the
researcher to systematically compare data items as well as recognize and analyze
potential patterns or characteristics in the data from a multitude of angles and over time.
These memos will also give other researchers access to the precise rationale for analytical
judgments.
Each section of the coding memo is briefly described in the following section.
Type of Data- The type of data source is clearly identified. This section will allow to the
analyst to systematically sort and compare the thematic features of political columns,
editorials, and opinion-editorials. For example, Nicholas Kristof’s Guns of September
was labeled as a political column.
Citation- Each opinion piece will be cataloged and cited in APA style. As a result, the
analyst will readily be able to sort the data by author, date, or title. The citation will also
readily allow the analyst to perform a comparative analysis between recurring political
columnists or op-ed contributors as well as analysis of thematic trends over time.
Thematic Categories- The identification and labeling of themes will be placed here. In
an effort to remain grounded in the data, the analyst will often use the words of the
investigated writers to come up with the names for the thematic categories. Words,
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phrases, and entire passages from the text will be included in section in order to support
and justify thematic judgments. For example, partisan policy argumentation is the
thematic category for the words like case, call, and speech.
Properties- “… properties are the general or specific characteristics or attributes of a
category” (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 117). For example, evidence was regarded as a
property of the partisan policy argumentation, which was a thematic category.
Dimensions- “…dimensions represent the location of a property along a continuum or
range” (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 117). For example, urgency was considered to be a
dimension of evidence.
Comments- This section of these coding memos is designed to provide a forum where
the analyst can reflectively consider the “range of potential meanings contained within”
the text in order to determine the appropriateness of the proposed thematic categories as
well as the exact nature of the supposed linkages between those thematic categories and
the text (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 109). This section allows the contextual dimensions
of the text to be recorded and fully examined. In this section, exhaustive comparison,
sensitivity to contextual factors, rigorous questioning, brainstorming, and alternative
explanations will be employed in an effort to achieve a more thorough analysis of the
data (Strauss & Corbin, 1998).
An example of the coding memo is located in the Appendix A.
Mode Of Analysis
The mode of analysis for this study “is to peruse the entire document” in order to
identify the overarching theme or themes as they pertain to President Bush’s stewardship
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of Iraq policy in individual political columns, opinion-editorials, and editorials and
ultimately for the entire collection of writings (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 120).
Validity Safeguards
Comparative Analysis
The process of constant comparison and evaluation associated with analytic
induction gives the researcher the flexibility to recognize and remedy flaws in premature
inferences and categorizations in coding schemes (Lindolf & Taylor, 2002; Taylor,
1994). The researcher for this study will constantly recheck his coding decisions in effort
to achieve validity, precision, and consistency in his coding categories. Such a process
will help ensure that the researcher detects the critical moment of redundancy, which
indicates the point where a repeated item can be categorized as a major theme (Guba,
1990; Haley, 1996; Taylor, 1994).
Alternative Explanations
More broadly, the integrity of analysis in qualitative research can be strengthened
by consideration of alternative explanations (Patton, 1990; Taylor, 1994). This means
that the researcher seriously considers the possibility of better explanations that are more
grounded in the data than his or her own explanation. Patton (1990) writes,
When considering rival organizing schemes and competing explanations the
mind-set is not one of attempting to disprove the alternatives; rather, the analyst
looks for data that support alternative explanations. Failure to find strong
supporting evidence for alternative ways of presenting the data or contrary
explanations helps increase confidence in the original, principal explanation
generated by the analyst. (p. 462)
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This process is analogous to how a college debater can improve his confidence in his
own arguments, if after a genuine search, he unable to find adequate support for the
perspective or rebuttals of his opponent.
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Chapter 5
Results
The purpose of this study was to investigate the major thematic patterns that
emerge from political columns, editorials, and opinion-editorials in The New York Times
regarding President Bush’s professional reputation as it related to the initial phase of his
stewardship of U.S. policy regarding Iraq in the fall of 2002. The basis for this research
objective is rooted in Richard Neustadt’s seminal theory of presidential power, which not
only claims that the “echoes” of the president’s professional reputation can be heard in
the opinion section of national newspapers like The New York Times but also that “there
usually is a dominant tone, a central tendency, in Washington appraisals of a President”
that emerges from the opinion section of national newspapers (1990, p. 53). If
Neustadt’s claim is true, one would suspect that an overarching theme or set of themes
regarding the professional reputation of President Bush as it related to his stewardship of
U.S. policy regarding Iraq between September 11, 2002 and November 8, 2002 would
emerge from a collection of political columns, editorials, and opinion-editorials that
appeared in The New York Times during the aforementioned specified time period.
Through multiple in-depth readings of the text, in which the analyst thoroughly
crosschecked his thematic categories at the substantive and conceptual level in order to
buttress the veracity of his analytical judgments, a definite mosaic of elite opinion
regarding President Bush’s stewardship of Iraq policy during the fall of 2002 emerged
and crystallized around a well integrated set of themes. The broad contours of this
thematic mosaic cut across a significant number of editorials, opinion-editorials, and
political columns surveyed in this study to varying degrees of saliency. Even in cases

37
where the expression of themes identified as major or overarching sometimes seemed
rather latent or opaque, one got the sense through sensitivity to the context in which the
themes were embedded that these themes were fundamental to elite perceptions of the
president’s professional reputation. Thus, broadly speaking Neustadt’s claim that
typically “a dominant tone, a central tendency, in Washington appraisals of a President”
will emerge from political commentary found in the opinion section of major newspapers
was confirmed in this population of opinion writings (1990, p. 53).
The purpose of this inquiry was to document any emergence of “a dominant tone,
a central tendency, in Washington appraisals of” President Bush’s stewardship of Iraq
policy, and in an effort to remain grounded in the data and in order to give the reader a
sense of how the emergence of major themes took place, the results of this inquiry were
reported by outlining the evolution of major themes from a single article to across several
articles (Neustadt, 1990, p. 53). The actual contours of major themes regarding the
president’s professional reputation were delineated by highlighting their defining
properties and dimensions.
Overarching Theme
The overarching theme for this collection of elite writings was identified as the
following: Substantively speaking, the president made a “forceful” case that Iraq was
governed by a rogue regime that possessed illegal stockpiles of weapons of mass
destruction in his speech to the United Nations on September 12, 2002 and in subsequent
statements, but the president failed to make a strong evidentiary case that the Iraqi regime
was an imminent threat that warranted the president’s perceived policy preference of
immediate preemptive military action.
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The first half of the overarching theme signifies agreement with the president’s
characterization of the Iraqi regime as rogue given Iraq’s supposed possession of illegal
stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), its history of maltreatment of the
Iraqi people, and its intransigence towards the international community (Kristof, 2002a;
“The Iraq Test,” 2002; “The Road Map for Iraq,” 2002). The data suggested that there
was widespread consensus within this elite community about the correctness of this
specific aspect of the president’s assessment of the Iraqi regime, because virtually no one
within this collection of elite writings even bothered to challenge its veracity. However,
the amount of credit that was afforded to the president by this collection of elites for this
correct observation seemed to be somewhat limited by the widespread perception among
the political establishment that the president was stating the obvious (Kristof, 2002a;
Jundt, 2002).
However, the second half of the overarching theme indicates that many elites
believed the president misinterpreted or exaggerated the meaning and implications of the
Iraqi regime’s rogue posture as it related to American and global security in order to
rationalize a controversial policy prescription. Based upon the evidentiary case that the
president proffered, the president was perceived to have assigned a degree of imminence
to the Iraqi threat that was unwarranted, and as a result, the president’s perceived policy
preference of immediate preemptive military action was generally regarded as a
premature and ill-advised overreaction. Furthermore, the president’s perceived rush to
adopt a risky and unnecessary prescription to the Iraqi threat even after his failure to
empirically substantiate the imminence of the Iraqi threat engendered serious concern
about the president’s judgment and forbearance (Albright, 2002; Benjamin, 2002;
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Danner, 2002; Viorst, 2002). Given its content, implications, and the generally negative
tenor in which the aforementioned overarching theme was expressed, one got the sense
that this theme’s adherents had a generally negative opinion of the president’s
professional reputation.
Conceptual Category Of Overarching Theme
The goal of this research was to provide a conceptual as well as a descriptive
analysis of elites’ overarching perceptions of the president’s professional reputation as it
related to the president’s stewardship of Iraq policy, thus the overarching theme within
this collection of elite writings was categorized “under more abstract explanatory terms”
in order to facilitate deeper analytical analysis of the concepts that serve as this theme’s
infrastructure (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 114). This theme was broken-down into an
overarching conceptual category, subcategories, properties, and dimensions (Strauss &
Corbin, 1998).
The data suggested that this collection of elites demanded the president to make
the case for his policy assessment and preferences based upon empirical evidence and
sound logic, and their appraisals of the president’s professional reputation seemed to
emanate from their perceptions of the strengths and weaknesses in the president’s
rationale (Kristof, 2002a; “More Than One Option on Iraq,” 2002; “The Politics of War,”
2002; “The Healthy Politics of Iraq,” 2002; “The Illusory Prague Connection,” 2002).
The content of the theme suggested that the president was perceived to have presented a
“circumstantial” evidentiary case for his policy that failed to justify the president’s
diagnosis and prescription concerning the threat posed by Iraq (“A Measured Pace on
Iraq,”2002; Albright, 2002; Byrd, 2002, p. A39; Rich, 2002a). Furthermore, a sensitive
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reading of contextual auxiliary themes and the language that this overarching theme was
couched in also suggested the president’s case was perceived to be suspect due in part to
the undue influence of a radical and inflexible ideological perspective (Dowd, 2002c,
2002d; Friedman, 2002b; Krugman, 2002b; Rich, 2002a).
The overarching thematic category was policy argumentation, because the
overarching theme essentially amounted to the expression of the substantive content of an
appraisal of the case, rationale or argument that the president put forward for his policy.
One got sense that many elites perceived that the president interpreted the Iraqi threat in
part through the prism of an ideology, so ideology was considered to be a defining
property of the president’s policy argumentation. This property was dimensionalized
along a continuum of political ideologies. Ideological policy argumentation became the
final label for the overarching conceptual thematic category.
The president’s ideological policy argumentation was divided into two
subcategories- diagnosis and prescription. Diagnosis pertains to elite perceptions of the
president’s assessment of the Iraqi threat. Prescription pertains to elite perceptions of the
president’s policy recommendations. Elite perceptions seemed predominately to turn on
evaluations of the president’s empirical evidence, so evidence was a defining property for
both subcategories. The central purpose of the evidence was to shed light on the question
of whether Iraq was an imminent threat or not, thus the property of evidence was
dimensionalized along a continuum of urgency. Unintended consequences were a
property of the president’s perceived policy preference of immediate preemptive military
action, and this property was dimensionalized along a continuum of probability regarding
the likelihood that negative unintended consequences would result from the president’s
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perceived policy preference of immediate preemptive military action. A table of this
thematic category and its defining properties can be found in Appendix B.
Discovery Of Fragments Of Overarching Thematic Category In Single Article
The paradigmatic perspective for this study requires that analytical judgments be
made inductively through emersion in the data and a commitment to accurately report the
data from the perspective of the investigated subjects (Guba, 1990; Strauss & Corbin,
1998). In an effort to illustrate the analyst’s fidelity to rigorous analytic induction, the
results are presented by demonstrating how major thematic categories were initially
identified and confirmed in a single representative selection through open coding
procedures, and then the analyst subsequently explicates the axial and selective coding
process by which the emergence of major thematic patterns are identified within and
across articles.
A September 13, 2002 column entitled The Guns of September, written by
political columnist Nicholas Kristof as a response to the president’s historic address to
the United Nations on September 12, 2002, was selected as a starting point for discussing
the process by which some of the concepts that make up the overarching theme were
initially identified and confirmed in a single opinion piece, because this column provided
clues as to how the overarching theme emerged and then consolidated within this
population of elite writings. Given the fact that the American political system expects
presidents to be a catalyst for the policymaking process by offering proposals that the
political establishment can respond to, the fact that the one of the primary functions of the
United Nations is to serve as a forum where nations can express their sentiments and
proposals to their international colleagues, and the counterargument structure of Kristof’s
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column, Kristof seemed to have conceptualized the president’s address as an important
policy statement, argument, or case that should be scrutinized and debated (Kristof,
2002a; Neustadt,1990). From the very beginning of his column, Kristof also seemed to
have broken-down the president’s address into two subcategories-- the president’s
diagnosis of the Iraqi threat and the president’s prescription to resolve the Iraqi threat.
In the first three paragraphs of his column, Kristof (2002a) roughly outlined with
a few exceptions the basic concepts that served as the cornerstones of the theme that gave
expression to the dominate elite perceptions regarding the president’s professional
reputation:
President Bush yesterday offered an eloquent, forceful and overdue call for the
U.N. to hold Saddam Hussein accountable.
Just one problem: He cited no evidence of any immediate threat, no reason
that invading Iraq is any more urgent today than it was in, say, 2000, when Mr.
Bush as a candidate huffed and puffed about Saddam but never shared with voters
any plans for an invasion.
For months there had been hints about intelligence that the administration
supposedly has gathered about an imminent threat and about links to terrorism.
So it was deflating to hear again that Saddam is a monster whose regime tortures
children in front of parents. All true- as it was a decade ago. (p. A27)
In these opening paragraphs, Kristof suggested that the Iraqi regime had a record
of brutality towards its own people that extended back a decade, thus he indicated
agreement with the president’s condemnation of the Iraqi dictator as “a monster” (2002a,
p. A27). He signaled support for the president’s “eloquent, forceful and overdue call for
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the U.N. to hold Saddam Hussein accountable” seemingly at least in part due to the Iraqi
regime’s record of criminality, however the data also suggested that he parted company
with the president with regards to the form that accountability ought take due to a
difference of opinion as to what the record of Iraqi brutality meant to global security
(Kristof, 2002a, p. A27). For Kristof, evidence of cruelty and oppression by the Iraqi
tyrant against his own domestic population did not constitute an “imminent Iraqi threat”
to American or world security, thus accountability for the Iraqi regime need not come in
the form of a military invasion (2002a, p. A27).
Kristof’s suggested that his deflated response to the president’s address was due
in part to the president’s failure to use his address as the forum to unveil the “intelligence
that the administration supposedly has gathered about an imminent Iraqi threat and about
links to terrorism” (2002a, p. A27). The fact that Kristof’s opinion of the president’s
address seemed to rise or fall on basis of his perceptions regarding the quality of the
presented evidence and the degree of congruence between what the evidence meant and
what the president recommended in light of that evidence suggested that Kristof
conceptualized evidence to be the infrastructure of the president’s policy statement. In a
more detailed conceptual sense, one might say that empirical evidence was a defining
property of the president’s policy argumentation.
Close examination of the data seems to suggest that Kristof’s appraisals of the
president’s evidence regarding the Iraqi threat and ultimately his appraisal of the
president’s policy prescription of military invasion turns on the level of urgency Kristof
attributes to the Iraqi threat. Kristof provides some clarification of what he regards as
strong evidence of an urgent threat, when he compared and contrasted President Bush’s
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evidence against Iraq to the Kennedy administration’s dramatic presentation of
photographic evidence of “Russian missile sites in Cuba” at the United Nations during
the Cuban Missile Crisis (2002a, p. A27). In Kristof’s mind, President Kennedy, unlike
President Bush, was able to extinguish any potential skepticism about the veracity or
imminence of the threat posed by the Soviet missiles by presenting strong empirical
evidence of their existence, and he was also able to establish credibility for his
stewardship by proposing a thoughtful response that was commensurate to the level of
danger that the evidence indicated:
Contrast Mr. Bush’s appearance with a legendary moment at the United Nations.
On Oct. 25, 1962, during the Cuban missile crisis, Ambassador Adlai Stevenson
denounced the new Russian missile sites in Cuba.
The Russians and Cuban scoffed that it was all a lie, so Stevenson brought
in an easel and blown-up photos of the Cuban sites.
Where is the comparable evidence of urgency today?
It’s the Bush Administration that raised the parallel to the missile crisis,
noting that Kennedy had considered pre-emptive strikes. Fair enough.
Yet it is the differences that are most telling. To begin with, Kennedy
used the U.N. spotlight to offer specific, incontrovertible evidence of an urgent
new threat – and then opted not for an invasion of Cuba but for an internationally
supported naval quarantine.
“Yes, Kennedy did consider a lot of alternatives, including military
strikes,” recalled Theodore Sorensen, a key aide to Kennedy during the crisis.
“But after considering the innocent civilians who would be killed, considering the
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international law that would be broken, Kennedy rejected that possibility.”
(Kristof, 2002a, p. A27)
In this comparison, Kristof seemed to suggest that President Kennedy had proffered
evidence of an imminent threat that was stronger than any evidence President Bush had
proffered regarding Iraq, yet President Kennedy seemed more reluctant than President
Bush to propose preemptive war. Why? The answer seemed due to Kennedy’s concerns
over unintended consequences. Kristof perceived Kennedy’s reluctance to be an
admirable sign of humble forbearance regarding the unintended consequences of war,
which he regrettably found to be lacking in President Bush’s stewardship of Iraq policy.
Kristof refers to the notion of urgency or imminence six times in this column as a
benchmark for assessing evidence regarding threats to national security and the
appropriateness of suggested policy prescriptions for those threats, particularly when
those policy prescriptions involve the potential of military action. His column suggested
that he differentiated evidence regarding the meaning of threats along a continuum of
urgency. Thus, urgency was a dimension of the evidence regarding the Iraqi threat.
Based upon Kristof’s analysis of the evidence presented by the president in his
address to the U.N., Iraq did not warrant the characterization of imminent or urgent
threat, because Iraq did not rise to a certain level of urgency. Kristof highlighted the fact
that “every president until now has chosen to deter and contain Saddam” (2002a, p.
A27). As a result, he appeared to be skeptical of abandoning the longstanding policies of
deterrence and containment in favor of the president’s suggestion of preemptive military
action. Throughout his column, Kristof (2002a) seems to be looking for the president to
present new and compelling evidence that not only undermines the logical and factual
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basis of the United States’ longstanding policy towards Iraq but also justifies the
president’s risky policy prescription of preemptive military action:
Before launching a war, Mr. Bush still needs to show two things: first, that the
threat is so urgent that letting Iraq fester is even riskier than invading it and
occupying it for years to come; second, that deterrence will no longer be
successful in containing Saddam. (p. A27)
The above passage reveals that Kristof’s aversion to the president’s policy
recommendation of war was rooted not only in the belief that the president failed to
demonstrate that Iraq was an imminent or urgent threat but also in the belief that the
president failed to appreciate the potential risks associated with war. As one scrutinized
the contextual meaning of the language that Kristof’s critique of the president’s policy
prescription was embedded in, one got the sense that risk in the form of unintended
consequences was what Kristof feared the most about the president’s prescription of war.
History books, leadership seminars, and policy white papers are filled with lessons
learned regarding examples of statesman who were undone by their failure to guard
against the unintended consequences of war. The fact that Kristof, as the centerpiece of
his column, made a point to compare President Bush’s strategy in Iraq to President
Kennedy’s leadership during the Cuban Missile Crisis spoke to the depth of his concern
regarding the possibility of negative unintended consequences resulting from an armed
invasion of Iraq. President Kennedy’s acute sensitivity to the potential dangers of
miscalculations during the Cuban Missile Crisis largely contributed to his historically
lauded professional reputation as a shrewd crisis manager (Freedman, 2000; Neustadt,
1990). In Kristof estimation, President Bush, regrettably, does not fare well in his
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comparison to President Kennedy, because the president’s articulation of his policy
prescription demonstrated a lack of awareness for the potentially calamitous
consequences of miscalculation.
President Kennedy was deeply conscious that wars can slip out of control,
and during the crisis he read Barbara Tuchman’s “Guns of August.”
Mr. Sorensen [senior aide to J.F.K.] recalls Kennedy telling aides that he
didn’t want future generations asking how the missile crisis had spiraled into war
and nobody having a good answer.
In his speech yesterday, President Bush displayed Kennedy’s toughness,
resolve, and even eloquence. But he did not display the other qualities of
leadership: humility about the risks of miscalculation, a passion to avoid war.
(Kristof, 2002a, p. A27)
Kristof’s column suggested that the high uncertainty associated with military
action and the possible unleashing of catastrophic unintended consequences should
temper the president’s predilection for war. In fact given the high uncertainty associated
with war, Kristof seemed to believe that a president who can successfully manage
national security threats without resorting to war should be applauded, and this type of
presidential leadership should be imitated when possible. Once again, Kristof (2002a)
cites Kennedy’s humility, restraint, and vigilance against miscalculation in the face of
great uncertainty during the Cuban Missile Crisis as a stark contrast to President Bush’s
approach towards Iraq in the fall of 2002:
Graham Allison, a professor at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government who
has written a book about the missile crisis, noted that Kennedy had stipulated that
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the missiles absolutely had to be removed from Cuba. But Kennedy turned first
to diplomacy and a blockade. He offered the Russians a graceful exit and thus
saved lives and avoided a dangerous spin into the unknown.
Today as well, why shouldn’t war be a last resort instead of the first tool
that President Bush grabs off the shelf? (p. A27)
In light of Kennedy’s appreciation for the risks associated with war, Kristof (2002a)
speculated about how Kennedy would have responded to the Iraq controversy:
How would J.F.K. have handled Iraq?
“As a believer in the U.N., he would have done everything he could, with
U.S. muscle, to get U.N. inspectors in there,” Mr. Sorensen believes. Such a
Kennedyesque approach, built around robust international inspections backed by
the threat of force as a last resort, would also reduce the political fallout of a war
if it eventually erupted. (p. A27)
The totality of this line reasoning suggested that Kristof believed that negative
unintended consequences are a likely property of the president’s policy prescription of
war. However, the president was not helpless, because he could have developed his
sensitivity to unintended consequences through prioritization and strategic planning.
President Bush’s professional reputation suffered, because the president’s seemingly
demonstrated no sensitivity or forbearance regarding potential unintended consequences.
To Kristof’s disappointment, rather than emulating Kennedy’s resolute yet
responsibly restrained approach President Bush seemed determined to leap into the abyss
of war without sufficient justification. Kristof (2002a) seemed to hint at the possibility
that the president intended to implement his policy preference of immediate preemptive
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war regardless of whether he made a case deemed compelling by the political
establishment or not:
Unfortunately, what we still have not heard from Mr. Bush is a compelling case
for the one course of action on which he seems fixated- immediate war. (p. A27)
So what is the major theme that emerged from this column? Before this question
is answered it is important note a few central features of the following explanation
regarding the results. In keeping with the mission of qualitative research, the coding
procedures and analysis of this study were designed to present the data from the
perspective of the participants, and as a result, the following integrated thematic
categories and thematic streams of thought are presented in the same synthesized
configuration as the participants presented it.
Taken altogether Kristof’s column suggested a mixed indictment of the
president’s ideological policy argumentation: The president made a “forceful” case that
Iraq was governed by a rogue Iraqi regime in his speech to the United Nations on
September 12, 2002, but the president failed to make a strong evidentiary case that the
Iraqi regime was an imminent threat that warranted the president’s perceived policy
preference of immediate preemptive military action.
Based upon the evidence and reasoning showcased in the president’s U.N.
speech (ideological policy argumentation), the president mischaracterized the evidence
regarding the Iraqi threat by attributing a high level of urgency to it that was unwarranted.
In Kristof’s estimation, the president failed to recognize or acknowledge the unintended
consequences that might be unleashed by a premature move to war. The fact that the
president “seems fixated” on preemptive war may explain his dubious and potentially
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ideological interpretation of Iraqi threat (Kristof, 2002a, p. A27). In light of these
deficiencies, the president’s recommendation or policy prescription of war against Iraq
was unjustified.
One might reasonably infer from Kristof’s column that he believed that the
president’s recommendation of war was not only premature but also dangerously reckless
and irresponsible. From Kristof’s perspective, President Bush seemingly lacked the
insight, judgment and forbearance necessary to address the policy dilemmas presented by
Saddam’s Iraq. The content and the overall tone of the column suggested that Kristof had
deep and seemingly negative misgivings about President Bush’s professional reputation.
Identification Of A Thematic Pattern Across Articles
Broadly speaking, the contours of the thematic mosaic identified in Kristof’s
column emerged rather evenly across the majority of editorials, opinion-editorials, and
political columns surveyed in this study. The pervasiveness of the aforementioned
thematic sentiment constitutes a general consensus of opinion regarding the president’s
stewardship of U.S. policy towards Iraq in the fall of 2002 and a confirmation, within this
particular context, of Neustadt’s claim that typically “a dominant tone” regarding the
president’s professional reputation emerges amongst political elites (1990, p. 53).
The grouping of selections under the same overarching thematic heading was
determined by identifying general correspondence between thematic categories and their
defining properties and dimensions (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). When the analyst detected
redundancy in the data, the analyst declared the establishment of a thematic pattern
(Taylor, 1994).

51
Certainly the reader will detect some thematic variation from Kristof’s
articulation in the following selections. For example, the overarching theme’s
characterization of the Iraqi regime evolves to include the consensus view that the Iraqi
regime possessed illegal stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction (Albright, 2002; “A
Measured Pace on Iraq,” 2002; “The Iraq Test,” 2002). In Kristof’s specified column, he
alluded to the uncertainties, miscalculations, and negative ramifications that often emerge
from war without providing much clarification (2002a). In this population of opinion
pieces, a degree of clarity about potential unintended consequences begins to emerge
with a significant number of elites citing the possibility that a war with Iraq could divert
America and the world from the global war on terrorism (Albright, 2002; Dowd, 2002b;
“The Iraqi Chessboard,” 2002). Close examination of the data also revealed that the
expression of concern over uncertainties, miscalculations, and ramifications associated
with war was slightly more muted in the editorials than it was in the opinion-editorials
and political columns. In another instance, the inferiority of president’s ideological
policy argumentation in comparison to his presidential predecessors was not consistently
stressed across this collection of elite writings.
Nevertheless, the presence of the other core elements of the theme specified
within Kristof’s September 13th column was certainly documented in a significant
number of these writings, and this fact should become readily apparent to the reader upon
further review. Furthermore, this type of analysis operates on the following premise:
. . . when an analyst groups data into patterns according to certain defined
characteristics, it should be understood that not every object, event, happening, or
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person fits a pattern completely . . . . This is okay within limits. (Strauss &
Corbin, 1998, p. 118)
The following excerpts from this population of writings are offered to substantiate
the pervasiveness of the following theme amongst this population of opinion writers
between September 11, 2002 and November 8, 2002: The president made a “forceful”
case that Iraq was governed by a rogue regime that possessed illegal stockpiles of
weapons of mass destruction in his speech to the United Nations on September 12, 2002
and in subsequent statements, but the president failed to make a strong evidentiary case
that the Iraqi regime was an imminent threat that warranted the president’s perceived
policy preference of immediate preemptive military action.
Based upon the evidence and reasoning showcased in the president’s public
statements (ideological policy argumentation), the president misdiagnosed the Iraqi
threat. He also mischaracterized the evidence regarding the Iraqi threat by attributing a
level of urgency to it that was unwarranted. The president seemingly failed to recognize
the possible unintended consequences that might be unleashed by a premature move to
war. In light of these deficiencies, the president’s policy prescription of immediate
military action against Iraq was unjustified. The president’s prescription was not only
premature but also dangerously reckless and irresponsible.
Iraq Not Imminent Threat
The initial reaction to the president’s historic address was considerable skepticism
regarding the president’s claim that Iraq was an imminent threat to America or the
international community that must be remedied through preemptive military action. The
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New York Times’ editorial board in a September 14, 2002 editorial entitled A Measured
Pace on Iraq remarked:
The president made a compelling case in his U.N. speech on Thursday for
eliminating Iraq’s unconventional weapons and insisting that Baghdad comply
with the Security Council longstanding disarmament orders. . . . Mr. Bush,
however, did not show that immediate action [preemptive military action] was
warranted. . . . (p. A14)
Jessica T. Mathews, president of the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, and Charles G. Boyd, a retired general of the Air Force, a fellow of the Council of
Foreign Relations (a respected and well-connected think tank on foreign policy issues),
and the president of Business Executives for National Security, in a September 19th
opinion-editorial entitled Arming the Arms Inspectors challenged the president’s
characterization of the Iraqi regime and his policy recommendation by offering an
alternative to both:
Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction pose a pressing threat but not an immediate
one. There is time to do the right thing and no reason to choose war as a first
resort. If the goal is Iraqi disarmament, there is a peaceful means to achieve it.
(2002, p. A35)
The New York Times’ syndicated columnist Tom Friedman expressed his
skepticism towards the president’s characterization of the Iraqi threat and the president’s
policy prescription for the Iraqi threat by contrasting them with the threat from Al Qaeda,
the terrorist group responsible for the catastrophic terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001, and U.S.’s longstanding policy of deterrence towards Iraq:
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First, Americans understand that the war against Al Qaeda in Afghanistan was a
war of “no choice”- and millions of Americans would have volunteered to fight
there. Iraq, however, is widely perceived as a war of “choice.” Yes, Saddam is
dangerous, but he poses no immediate threat to us and has proved to be deterrable.
(2002a, p. 13)
Skepticism Regarding Evidentiary Analysis & Trepidation Regarding Presidential
Anticipation Of Unintended Consequences
A bit of context is needed in order have an appropriate appreciation of the
dynamic that was taking place between the president and this collection of political elites.
Al Qaeda, under the leadership of Osama bin Laden, was the terrorist organization
responsible for the catastrophic terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In the wake of
this traumatic event, President Bush pledged to wage an unwavering war against terrorist
groups like Al Qaeda and their state sponsors (Purdum, 2003). In the buildup to
confrontation with Iraq, Purdum goes on to report that the president routinely framed his
policy towards Iraq as part of his strategy to win the larger war against terrorism.
President Bush charged that Saddam’s Iraq was a part of the infamous “axis of evil”,
because Iraq had weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ties to terrorist organizations
like Al Qaeda (Bush, 2002a, para. 20). Despite the forcefulness of the president’s
pronouncements, many elites remained skeptical of the evidentiary basis of the
president’s policy argumentation and unconvinced by administration suggestions that a
military campaign against Iraq was part of the larger war on terrorism.
The president was perceived by many elites to be too cavalier in his promotion of
his perceived policy preference of preemptive war, and this widespread perception led
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many to believe that the president was irresponsibly underestimating the dangers of war.
One opinion-editorial writer went so far as to suggest, “. . . the president is clearly
choosing not to consider the worst-case scenario at all” (Viorst, 2002, p. A27). For
example in the eyes of many elites, the president seemingly failed to adequately consider
the possibility of negative unintended consequences resulting from his perceived policy
preference of preemptive war. Unintended consequences are the unexpected artifacts of
policy. A significant number of elites directly contradicted the president by suggesting
that one potential unintended consequence of the president’s perceived policy preference
was that a preemptive war with Iraq constituted a distraction rather than a component of
the war against terrorism. This appraisal was negative towards the president’s
professional reputation, because the commentators were deriding the president for not
anticipating a foreseeable unintended consequence.
Madeleine K. Albright, who was Secretary of State during the Clinton
Administration, wrote an opinion-editorial entitled Where Iraq Fits In The War On
Terror, in which she acknowledged the rogue nature of the Iraqi regime but nevertheless
refuted the president’s contention that Iraq was an imminent threat that warranted
immediate preemptive military action:
The core of President Bush’s forcefully delivered message on Iraq at the United
Nations yesterday was irrefutable. Saddam Hussein is a serial liar, a bully and a
threat to peace. He has used chemical weapons, and he yearns to impress an Arab
world that despises him by building a deliverable nuclear weapon.
The president made a strong case for international action that results in
either Iraqi compliance with its obligations or the establishment of a new and,
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ultimately, democratic government in Baghdad. . . .
I hope, however, that the president will not be pushed by his hard-line
advisers into an unwise timetable for military action. . . . (2002, p. A27)
Albright (2002) goes on to note some of the evidentiary deficiencies in the president’s
case and a possible negative consequence of going to war with Saddam-distracting
America and the world from the war against Al Qaeda:
It [Iraq] is striving to acquire or develop nuclear weapons, but there is no
evidence it has succeeded. . . .
Although the president’s speech yesterday was persuasive in many
respects, he was neither specific nor compelling in his effort to link Saddam
Hussein to other, more urgent threats. . . .
. . . But it makes little sense now to focus the world’s attention and our
own military, intelligence, diplomatic and financial resources on a plan to invade
Iraq instead of on Al Qaeda’s ongoing plans to murder innocent people. We
cannot fight a second monumental struggle without distracting from the first
one. (p. A27)
In an opinion-editorial entitled Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda Are Not Allies,
Daniel Benjamin (2002) who was a member of President Clinton’s National Security
Council from 1994 to 1999 argued:
Undoubtedly, Saddam Hussein is eager to procure weapons of mass destruction. .
. . These facts provide the basis for strong arguments in favor of removing him
from power. But such arguments need to be considered in their own right, and
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with the clear understanding that attacking Iraq would not be a continuation of the
war against terror but a deviation from it.
Iraq and Al Qaeda are not obvious allies. In fact, they are natural
enemies. (p. A25)
Tony Jundt, who is the director of the Remarque Institute at New York
University, wrote a highly critical opinion-editorial entitled The Wrong War at the Wrong
Time, which argued that even if you believe in the existence of Iraq’s WMD the
president’s irresponsible comments regarding ties between Saddam and Al Qaeda could
get America entangled into a disastrous military adventure that not only diverts
America’s attention from the war on terror but actually undermines America’s capacity to
respond to terrorist groups like Al Qaeda:
There is no clear link between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda. . . ; so advocates of
a war with Iraq have taken to claiming that such a link can’t be excluded, and
therefore it should be “pre-empted.” Few would deny that Saddam
Hussein is evil. And he surely has evil means at his disposal. . . . But this is the
wrong war at the wrong time. . . .
The worst thing about Mr. Bush’s pre-announced war with Iraq is that it is
not just a substitute for a war against terrorism; it actively impedes it.
(2002, p. 11)
The criticism regarding the veracity of the president’s contention that a war with
Iraq was a positive continuation of the overarching war against terror was not confined to
opinion-editorials. The Times’ colorful columnist, Maureen Dowd, in a column entitled
W.’s Conflicts of Interest, lamented, much like Kristof did in his column entitled The
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Guns of September, the lack of “compelling new evidence” and the possibility of
undesirable consequences for the war on terror resulting from a war with Iraq:
Mr. Bush gave a splendid speech at the U.N. He is right that Saddam is a scum
with Scuds.
But there was no compelling new evidence [of an imminent threat]. Mr.
Bush offered only an usually comprehensive version of the usual laundry list.
Saddam is violating the sanctions, he tried to assassinate Poppy, he’s late on his
mortgage payments, he tips 10 percent, he has unjustifiable fondness for “My
Way,” he gassed his own people, he doesn’t turn down the front brim of his
hat. . . .
The Bush principle of pre-emption is already being adored and exploited
by other world leaders who have their own devious uses for it. . . .
(2002b, p. 15)
In this same column, Dowd (2002b) went on to note the worries of Senator Daschle
concerning the possible ramifications of the president’s recommendation of preemptive
war on world stability and the war on terror:
Yet the senator worried that Mr. Bush’s preference for pre-emption could
wreak havoc on global stability , and he wondered whether attacking Iraq would
damage relationships with Indonesia, Pakistan, and the Middle East allies
necessary to root out terrorists. “Is this now more important than the war on
terror?” he asked.
Does America have conflicts of interests? Are we fighting one war in two
places, or are the two wars tripping each other up? (p. 15)
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From the very beginning of controversy, the editorial staff of The Times was
extremely skeptical of even the insinuation by administration officials that Iraq had
significant links to Al Qaeda. The Times editorial staff framed the issue by suggesting in
a September 17th editorial entitled The Iraqi Chessboard that a war with Iraq was not
part of the war on terror but rather like opening a second front against an entirely new
enemy:
If President Bush ends up waging a two-front war against America’s enemies, he
must be certain that the distractions of fighting Iraq do not divert the nation’s
attention from its original goal.
There might well be benefits to weakening or removing Mr. Hussein, if
the brewing conflict comes to that, but they would not include the dismantlement
of Al Qaeda. . . . there is little evidence to suggest that he [Saddam ] and Al
Qaeda are allies.
The war against terrorism has many pieces, some of which could be easily
undermined by a war with Iraq. (2002, p. A28)
Columnist Frank Rich reported that more and more members of the president’s own party
were concerned that the president’s recommendation of preemptive war against Iraq will
have the unintended consequence of distracting the America from the war on terrorism.
The campaign against Iraq, wrote Brent Scowcroft [former national security
adviser to President George H. W. Bush] in an op-ed that launched a thousand
others, “is certain to divert us for some indefinite period from our war on
terrorism.” (Rich, 2002a, p. A15)
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On September 28, 2002, The Times ran an editorial that also noted the president’s
inability to convince individuals like his father’s national security adviser regarding ties
between Iraq and Al Qaeda:
The administration has also lately taken to saying that there are extensive ties
between Iraq and Al Qaeda, a connection that Mr. Bush and other officials did
not emphasize before. If the administration wants to make this case, it will have
to produce better evidence than the imprecise assertions made in recent days by
top officials like Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. Brent Scowcroft, who was
national security adviser to Mr. Bush’s father and presently heads a White House
advisory board on intelligence matters, said in a Wall Street Journal article last
month that there was ‘scant’ evidence of a connection. (p. A16).
The initial skepticism by The Times editorial board regarding administration
assertions of links between Iraq and Al Qaeda quickly consolidated and held throughout
the two-month period of this study. In an October 23, 2002 editorial, The Times bluntly
rebuked the Bush administration for, in its estimation, unsubstantiated and unscrupulous
assertions concerning links between Iraq and Al Qaeda:
In its campaign for military action against Iraq, the Bush administration
frequently asserts that it has proof of extensive ties between Iraq and Al Qaeda.
What it has disclosed, however, is unconvincing. This is no way to justify a
war… (p. A22)
With regards to the administration’s dubious use of evidence in an effort to link
Saddam to Al Qaeda and September 11th as a means of justifying war with Iraq, Maureen
Dowd (2002b) offered a column entitled Culture War With B-2’s that literally dripped
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with scathing sarcasm and open contempt for the administration’s handling of evidence.
Her comments are directed technically at Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, but a
complete reading of her column indicates that Rumsfeld is basically a proxy for criticism
directed at the president:
Mr. Rumsfeld offered sophistry instead of a smoking gun: “I suggest that
any who insist on perfect evidence are back in the 20th century and still thinking
in pre-9/11 terms.”
Ah, Rummy. Evidence, civil liberties, debating before we go to war . . .
it’s sooo 20th century. (p. 13)
The preceding passages seem to indicate a growing resentment, exasperation, and distrust
of the president and his surrogates for their lack of candor amongst this population of
elites.
Bob Herbert, in an October 12th column entitled Dancing In The Dark, provided
one of the most comprehensive expressions of the growing suspicion, trepidation, and
condemnation towards the president amongst this community of political elites. He
begins his column by poignantly quoting the warnings of Churchill regarding the
unpredictability of war:
“Never, never, never believe any war will be smooth and easy, or that
anyone who embarks on the strange voyage can measure the tides and hurricanes
he will encounter. The statesman who yields to war fever must realize that once
the signal is given, he is no longer the master of policy but the slave of
unforeseeable and uncontrollable events.” (2002a, p. A19)
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In accordance with Churchill’s sage advice, Herbert argues that the American people
should be made aware of the potential consequences of an Iraqi invasion. He writes, “. . .
the American people should at least have a clear sense of the potentially very heavy
consequences that may ensue”(Herbert, 2002, p. A19). However, instead of providing
this service to the American people, Herbert contends that the president irresponsibly
tried to create the public perception that war with Iraq would be controllable and easy:
The Bush administration, with its muscular rhetoric and trumpeting of a new
generation of weapons even smarter than those used in the gulf war, would be
happy to have the public think of the war as little more than a walk in the
park. . . .
It can sound so easy. But the truth is that the people of the United States
. . . are dancing in the dark on this issue. No one really knows where a U.S.-led
military invasion of Iraq will lead. Saddam’s regime can be destroyed, no doubt.
But what then? (2002, p. A19)
In regards to how an Iraqi war would impact the war on terrorism, Herbert asks, “How is
it possible that a war in Iraq and its aftermath will not divert attention and precious
resources from the crucial fight against more immediate terrorist threats” (2002, p.
A19)?
The conclusion of Herbert’s column seems to suggest that the president’s lack of
forthrightness and foresightedness regarding the many dilemmas associated with an
invasion of Iraq had created a leadership vacuum that had left the public uninformed, and
consequently the nation was vulnerable and ill prepared to meet the challenges it faced.
In a world as dangerous as ours has become, questions about the profound
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implications of a U.S.-led invasion of Iraq deserve much more in the way of
answers than we have now. Seldom has the U.S. had greater need for wise
and candid and prudent leadership. This is not a good time to be dancing in
the dark. (Herbert, 2002, p. A19)
Ideological Perspective
The data suggested that many elites perceived that the president interpreted the
Iraqi threat through the prism of ideology instead of through a rigorous fact-based
analysis. More specifically, the data suggested that some elites believed that the
September 11th attacks fundamentally altered and perhaps even distorted the president’s
perspective on Iraq. In the president’s eyes, Iraq went from a “pathetic dictatorship”
before 9/11 to an “imminent threat” that warranted immediate preemptive military action
after 9/11, however, some elites believed that nothing had substantively changed about
the Iraqi threat except the president’s “own sensibilities after the 9/11” (Kristof, 2002b, p.
A33).
In the aftermath of the catastrophic terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, a
significant number of elites insinuate that the president’s lack of sagacity concerning the
Iraqi threat was due to the rising influence of “administration hawks”(Dowd, 2002a;
Herbert, 2002). Administration hawks was a euphemism for advisers such as Vice
President Dick Cheney, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, and Deputy Defense
Secretary Paul Wolfowitz who trumpeted the virtues of a controversial ideological
perspective known as neoconservatism. Neoconservatism argued that the aggressive,
preemptive if necessary, use of American power and prestige in the toppling of
illegitimate regimes like Baathist Iraq ought to be central to America’s strategy in the war
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on terrorism (Herrmann & Reese, 2004). Some elites seemed to suggest that the
president’s increasing fidelity to the ideological perspective of his hawkish advisers was
reflected in the president’s calculated exploitation of America’s hypersensitivity to
potential threats following the September 11th terrorist attacks in order to rationalize his
audacious policy posture towards Iraq (Dowd, 2002c; Kristof, 2002b; Rich, 2002a).
Some elites argued that long before his speech to the United Nations in September of
2002 the president “began presenting the proposed Iraq campaign as a keystone of his
war on terror, an essential battle in a carefully constructed ideological crusade” (Danner,
2002, p. A27).
Many elites were disturbed by the president’s perceived policy preference of
preemptive war, because they believed that preemptive war was part of a new doctrine
that marked a stark and destructive deviation from the historical practices and principles
that America had built its security upon for over a half a century (Ackerman, 2002;
Danner, 2002; “The Bush Doctrine,” 2002; Wright, 2002). The data suggested that the
president’s doctrine of preemption was viewed as evidence that the president had drawn
the wrong lessons from the September 11th attacks, and as a result, the president’s rush to
implement the neoconservative policy prescriptions of his advisers was making America
and the world less rather than more secure. Ideology seemed to be pressing the president
to adopt a more reckless approach, thus causing the president to misread or embellish
some dangers and blinding the president to other dangers that he would ordinarily see. In
an opinion-editorial entitled The Wisdom of Imagining The Worst-Case Scenario, Milton
Viorst chastised the president for abandoning time-tested principles and practices that had
safeguarded the nation against nightmarish scenarios in order to proclaim “a new doctrine
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for America, the right of preemptive attack, to keep Saddam Hussein from using his
weapons”:
But on Sept. 11 we all learned that even disasters can be of an unexpected
magnitude. Forthrightness now demands that we gird not for some tepid end to
our conflicts but catastrophes hitherto unimaginable.
In preparing for a war against Iraq, President Bush urges us to overlook
that lesson. Categorizing Saddam Hussein as “evil,” he warns that the Iraqis have
nuclear, chemical and biological weapons with which to attack us. Mr. Bush’s
concern is justified, though some responsible statesmen at home and abroad
believe he overstates the danger. But in suggesting that our forces will dispose of
Saddam Hussein in a war that is quick and painless . . . the president clearly is
choosing not to consider the worst-case scenario at all. . . .
All our presidents, Republican and Democratic alike, accepted the
principle of avoiding a war that might wreck the planet. Mr. Bush is the first to
question this principle, and his resolve is bolstered by Vice President Dick
Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, both of whom close their eyes
to the potential ramifications of a war with Iraq. . . .
Is not Sept. 11 a compelling reminder that the steadfast vigilance exercised
by our leaders for half-century of cold war is wiser than rushing toward a worstcase outcome? (2002, p. A27)
Policymakers often must make subjective judgment calls in the analysis of
incomplete information or complex policy dilemmas, but even with this caveat seemingly
taken into account, the data suggests a prevailing albeit often subtle perception among
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this collection of elites that the president’s interpretation of intelligence regarding the
Iraqi threat, the president’s response to Iraqi diplomatic maneuvers, and the president’s
policy proposals inordinately and suspiciously reflected the maxims and hard line
remedies proscribed by the president’s perceived ideological perspective (Dowd, 2002d;
Friedman, 2002b; Krugman, 2002b; Rich, 2002a ). Instead of making his case based upon
a rigorous and pragmatic analysis of the facts, the president was increasing perceived to
be pushing an agenda. The implicit perception that an ideological and audacious
assertion of presidential prerogative trumped facts, historical precedent, and real concern
over the possible negative ramifications to American interests and prestige caused
considerable trepidation and even some indignation about the president’s stewardship of
policy (Ackerman, 2002; Danner, 2002; Kristof, 2002c; Rich, 2002a; Viorst, 2002).
Nevertheless, to the dismay of some elites, the president seemingly held on to
certain perceptions of Iraq irrespective of any countervailing facts, because those
perceptions corresponded to certain ideological truths, aims, preferences, and
perspectives that the president forged in the aftermath of the September 11th terrorist
attacks. If certain facts were incongruent with the president’s ideological perspective or
policy agenda, some elites insinuated that the president’s interpretation of the Iraqi threat
would either ignore or change those discrepancies. For example, Paul Krugman, a
columnist for The New York Times, reported in an October 25 column entitled Dead
Parrot Society of Washingtonians’ growing suspicions about the veracity of statements
coming from the White House regarding the nature of the Iraqi threat and the prospects of
war with Iraq:
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A few days ago The Washington Post’s Dana Milbank wrote an article explaining
that for George W. Bush, “facts are malleable.” Documenting “dubious, if not
wrong” statements on a variety of subjects, from Iraq’s military capability to the
federal budget, the White House correspondent declared that Mr. Bush’s “rhetoric
has taken some flights of fancy.”
Also in the last few days, The Wall Street Journal reported that “senior
officials have referred repeatedly to intelligence . . . that remains largely
unverified.” The C.I.A.’s former head of counterterrorism was blunter:
“Basically, cooked information is working its way into high-level
pronouncements.” USA Today reports that “pressure has been building on the
intelligence agencies to deliberately slant estimates to fit a political agenda.”
. . . . the Bush administration lies a lot. (2002b, p. A35)
The Times columnist, Frank Rich, also noted a growing concern among elites regarding
the veracity of administration statements regarding Iraqi’s weapons of mass destruction
program and its ties to terrorism:
What we have been getting instead is the one thing worse than no datafalse data. For months, administration officials have been trying to implicate
Iraq in 9/11 with the story of an alleged April 2001 meeting in Prague between
Mohamed Atta and a Saddam spy. But the C.I.A. can find no evidence of this,
and the 21-page fact sheet the U.S. released with the president’s speech mentions
no Saddam-9/11 link at all. As for nuclear arms, last weekend in his appearance
with Tony Blair the president referred to a 1998 International Energy Agency
report that said Iraq was “six months away” from developing a nuclear weapon,
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adding “I don’t know what more evidence we need.” Plenty more, as it happens,
because an agency spokesman says no such report exists. This is why those who
most want to believe Mr. Bush, from a conservative G.O.P. Senate Leader like
Don Nickles to our allies, keep saying (in Mr. Nickles’s words), “You’re not
giving us enough.” . . .
. . . . there is a widening credibility gap between the White House’s
marketing of the war and the known facts. (2002a, p. 15)
Phrases such as “facts are malleable,” “cooked information is working its way
into high-level pronouncements,” “pressure has been building on the intelligence
agencies to deliberately slant estimates to fit a political agenda,” and “there is a widening
credibility gap between the White House’s marketing of the war and the known facts”
indicate a perception of a president pushing an partisan agenda or cherry picking
evidence to support a preconceived ideological perspective (Krugman, 2002a, p. A35;
Rich, 2002a, p. 15).
After all, if a policymaker believed he was preaching the “gospel” regarding the
Iraqi threat, then you might not expect him to lose faith because of a few incongruent
facts. However, Kristof (2002b) cautioned against adopting the military option on such a
dubious ideological perspective:
Before we prepare to go to war, we need to take a deep breath and make sure
we are doing so to overcome a threat that is real and enduring, not one that we
are conjuring up in part out of our trauma of 9/11. (p. A33)
Some elites tried to sharpen their remarks by highlighting the fact that Mr.
Bush’s presentation at the U.N. had failed to convince even some of his staunchest
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supporters that there was evidence that Iraq was imminent threat that warranted
preemptive action by the United States, thus, indicating that even some of the president’s
traditional supporters desired “more facts than sermons” from the president (Rich, 2002a,
p. 15). Furthermore, the fact that some of the criticisms being directed at the president
came from his own political base suggests that these criticisms had some reach within
this community and could not be dismissed as simply partisan attacks. Frank Rich, in a
political column entitled Never Forget What?, reported:
Peggy Noonan, as faithful a George W. Bush partisan as there is, sharpened the
question most pointedly on the Wall Street Journal editorial page on Wednesday,
when she implored the president to give us facts instead of sermons in making his
case. “ ‘Saddam is evil’ is not enough,” she wrote. “A number of people are evil,
and some are even our friends. ‘Saddam has weapons of mass destruction’ is not
enough. A number of countries do. What the people need now is hard data that
demonstrate conclusively that Saddam has weapons of mass destruction which he
is readying to use on the people of the U.S. or people of the West.”
(2002a, p. A15)
Given ideology’s presence in the expression of the president’s policy
argumentation, ideology was considered a property of the president’s policy
argumentation. Given its importance to the conceptual understanding of the policy
argumentation theme, the word ideological was added to policy argumentation.
Generally, the expression of this apprehension concerning the president’s seemingly
ideological stewardship of policy towards Iraq was more latent than the above examples,
nevertheless this subterranean sentiment was detectable to an analyst who was
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sufficiently sensitive to the contextual conditions in which it was embedded. Therefore,
this property would be dimensionalized as low to moderate on a scale of saliency
Second Thematic Pattern
The idea that the president made a “forceful” case regarding the rogue nature of
the Iraqi regime in his speech to the United Nations on September 12, 2002 and
subsequent statements but he failed to demonstrate that Iraq was an imminent threat that
warranted immediate preemptive military action was certainly the most salient theme
within this body of elite literature. However, there was another subordinate theme set
that emerged from the data, and this second theme set was also critical to understanding
these elite appraisals of President Bush’s leadership. This theme set was designated as
slightly subordinate in relation to the aforementioned overarching theme, because its
presence in the data was more irregular and subtle. The expression of this theme set
tended to be more heavily concentrated and explicit in the editorials and political
columns and somewhat more muted and sporadic in the opinion-editorials. As this
analyst attempted to make sense of these documents through a contextually sensitive
mindset, he got the sense that the subtle expression of this theme set was due to the fact
its basic elements were so deeply ingrained in the collective psyche of this community
that it had almost obtained the status of an a priori assumption, and therefore, this theme
set was seemingly regarded by a significant segment of elites as a virtual given that did
not need to be explained or defended. If one takes this view, one could certainly argue
that this theme was on par with the first integrated theme explicated in this study.
On the surface, the president, as commander-in-chief, may appear to have
considerable autonomy from Congress and other political constituencies in the area of
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diplomatic and national security affairs. After all, the president has tremendous
advantages such as direct supervision of the armed forces, access to secret information,
and the bully pulpit of the presidency over potential political rivals (DeClerico, 2000).
Nevertheless, Neustadt argues that the political system offers the president’s rivals
several constitutional and extraconstitutional mechanisms to undermine or thwart the
president’s leadership in diplomatic and national security affairs, and this ability to thwart
presidential influence over policy even includes initiatives that involve the president’s
command powers (i.e. powers that by law and by the Constitution must be respected and
followed) (1990).
Due to the diffusion of power within our interdependent political system,
Neustadt contends that the essence of presidential power is “the power to
persuade”(1990, p. 11). Key to the president’s capacity to persuade is his professional
reputation amongst political elites. Since professional reputation is predominately a
receiver-based phenomenon, the president’s capacity to shape his own reputation is
somewhat constrained by the fact that presidential action is interpreted through the lens
of others’ experiences and interests (Gleiber et al., 1998; Neustadt, 1990). At times, a
president’s professional reputation can be countervailing force to his own influence. If
significant number of elites believes that the president’s actions are inimical to their
interests or policy preferences, they can punish and even in the most extreme cases
delegitimatize him in the eyes of some by tarnishing his reputation as a leader (Neustadt,
1990).
The conceptual name of the second thematic category was elite skepticism of
presidential commitment to collegiality and diplomacy. There was considerable elite
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skepticism about the authenticity of the president’s commitment to pursue a peaceful
resolution to the Iraqi threat through collegial consultations with Congress and the United
Nations Security Council before resorting to armed conflict. In fact, a significant segment
of elites gradually seemed to have coalesced around the suspicion that the president’s
ulterior motivation for collegial enterprises with Congress and the Security Council was
to obtain politically expedient legitimacy for a virtually preordained armed invasion
against Iraq (Kristof, 2002b). The defining properties of this thematic category were
presidential duplicity, presidential coercive impatience, presidential partisan
demagoguery, and presidential contempt (see Appendix B).
Evidence For The Second Thematic Category
On Sptember 13, 2002, the day following the president’s address to the United
Nations, The New York Times in an editorial entitled The Iraq Test approvingly noted that
the president in a “welcomed and important” departure from previous “discordant and
belligerent rumblings about Iraq from various members of the administration” seemed to
articulate in a coherent fashion “a preference for working in concert with other nations
and seemed willing to employ measures short of war before turning to the use of force”
(2002, p. A26). The editorial (2002) also surmised:
Along with Mr. Bush’s commitment last week to seek Congressional assent for
any American military action in Iraq, his address yesterday offers the prospect of
a graduated response to threats presented by Saddam Hussein rather than the pellmell rush to armed conflict that Vice President Cheney and Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumfeld have been floating. (p. A26)
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The president’s collaborative approach gave the United States the moral and political
high ground in the debate over Iraq by focusing “the world attention’s on the dangers of
the Baghdad regime instead of the high-handedness of the United States”, and
furthermore, the multilateral approach forces the president’s critics to “face up to their
own rhetoric” by offering practical international solutions rather than just negative
criticism (“The Iraq Test,” 2002, p. A26). In short, this editorial characterized the
president’s diagnosis and prescription for the Iraqi threat as “well put”(“The Iraq Test,”
2002, p. A26).
Up to this point, this editorial seems to be a rather strong endorsement of the
president’s United Nations speech and approach to Congress as it related to Iraq policy.
However, closer inspection of the entire text suggests that the author(s) had serious
misgivings about the hawkish tenor of president’s prior leadership on this issue. There
were disapproving references or allusions to past administration behavior such as “a
summer of discordant and belligerent rumblings about Iraq from various administration
officials”. . . . “the pell-mell rush to armed conflict that Vice President Cheney and
Secretary of Defense have been floating . . . . “the high-handedness of the United States”
(“The Iraq Test,” 2002, p. A26). One must remember that Neustadt argued that political
elites attempt to discern “the appearance of a pattern” in presidential behavior, and
“lacking a better base, they tend to rest their forecasts of the future on such patterns as
they find”(1990, p. 52-53). The content of The Iraq Test editorial suggests that its
author(s) was assessing the president’s pretensions to collegiality through the prism of
previous and in this case contradictory demonstrations (at least contrary perceptions) of
presidential behavior, and this incongruence, in accordance with the tenets of Neustadt’s
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theory regarding professional reputation, was undermining the president’s capacity to
convince the sponsor(s) of this editorial of the veracity or authenticity of the president’s
collegial approach. In short, these prior misgivings served as a countervailing backdrop
to the president’s reported rhetoric that colored current perceptions regarding the
president’s collegial credentials. Given the president’s baggage from elite perceptions of
prior demonstrations of leadership, The Iraq Test editorial opined:
This will also be a test of Mr. Bush and the depth of his new-found collegiality. . .
. Now he must demonstrate sincerity about working closely with the U.N. [and
Congress] on Iraq, and developing a thoughtful and resourceful plan. He must not
treat yesterday’s speech as a symbolic gesture that can be quickly set aside to
make way for an American attack. (2002, p. A26)
Given the context in which it was embedded, the above excerpt constitutes the
overarching theme of this editorial as it pertains to the president’s professional reputation,
because this excerpt most completely reveals the intertwining sentiments that serve as the
centerpiece of this editorialist(s)’s perceptions of the president’s leadership.
When this editorial is deconstructed into interpretive abstractions in order to
identify thematic categories and discern conceptual significance, one detects favorable
allusions to diplomacy’s capacity to resolve this controversy peacefully and the need to
exhaust diplomatic initiatives before resorting to war. The data suggests that the
president’s leadership style will be critical to the success of diplomatic efforts, and in the
case of this controversy, the degree of collegiality in the president’s approach will
indicate the president’s level of commitment to the diplomatic process.
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This editorial suggests that the authenticity of the president’s pretensions to
collegial leadership will be measured by the president’s willingness to honor an
ambiguously (at least at this stage) defined ethos that underlies collegial leadership.
According to this editorial, the only explicit criterion for collegial leadership within the
context of the Iraqi issue is “sincerity about working closely with U.N. [and Congress]”,
however, the last sentence of the above excerpt suggests through implicit contrast with
the military alternative that patience is also a criterion of collegial leadership (“The Iraq
Test,” 2002, p. A26). Perhaps more importantly, the fact this editorial suggested that the
president might quickly resort to the military option implies that there is a suspicion that
the president, even at this early stage, is not firmly committed to the diplomatic process.
Furthermore, if the president quickly resorts to armed conflict then this editorial suggests
that one might reasonably infer that the president’s machinations about his aspirations for
a collegial solution were a politically expedient pretext for military action. Furthermore,
by designating the potential military option as American, one might infer that this
writer(s) has imbued his critique of the president’s pretensions to international
collegiality with notions inimical to collegiality like nationalistic unilateralism.
Thus, in this single editorial, one can begin to trace the preliminary contours or
fragmentary basis of the following theme: There was considerable elite skepticism about
the authenticity of the president’s commitment to facilitate a peaceful resolution to the
Iraqi threat through collegial consultations with Congress and the United Nations
Security Council before resorting to armed conflict. In fact, sentiment among a
significant segment of elites gradually seemed to have coalesced around the suspicion
that the president’s ulterior motive for consultations with Congress and the Security
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Council was to gain politically expedient legitimacy for a virtually preordained armed
invasion of Iraq.
Contours Of Second Thematic Category Across Articles
The central excerpt from The Iraq Test suggests skepticism concerning the
president’s public commitment to engage in a genuine collegial dialogue with Congress
and the United Nations about Iraq. The author(s) seems to be considering the possibility
that the president’s engagement of Congress and advocacy of multilateral diplomacy was
a duplicitous “symbolic gesture” designed to provide political cover for a preordained
American military attack against Iraq, although at this preliminary stage, its hard to
determine the exact nature or configuration of the expressed sentiment without further
explication of the sentiment’s defining properties and dimensions (“The Iraq Test,” 2002,
p. A26). However, the contours of the theme emerged and came into clearer focus as
one identified and defined its appropriate properties and dimensions across the entire
range of applicable writings.
The contours of this second thematic category emerged from the data at different
degrees of salience and meaning. Skepticism of the authenticity of the president’s
commitment to pursue a peaceful resolution to the Iraqi threat through collegial
consultations with Congress and the United Nations Security Council before resorting to
armed conflict was the most salient and pejorative among The Times’ political
columnists, as a result, the most negative perceptions of the president’s professional
reputation tended to be found in political columns. Skepticism of the president’s
leadership style and policy motivations was also quite salient among The Times’
editorials, however the skepticism tended to be not as pejorative as the political columns.
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Skepticism of the president’s leadership style and policy motivations tended to be more
sporadic, subtle, and balanced in the opinion-editorials.
Presidential Duplicity
This body of elite literature on the professional reputation of President Bush
reveals widespread skepticism about the president’s “willingness to exhaust peaceful
approaches before advocating war” through collegial enterprises with Congress and the
Security Council, because the president’s ideological framing of the September 11th
experience, record, and rhetoric created a widespread perception that the president “was
just going through the multilateral motions” in order to get political cover for a
preordained armed invasion with Iraq (Dowd, 2002b, p. 15; Kristof, 2002b; “The Bush
Doctrine,” 2002; “Testing Iraq on Arms Inspectors,” 2002, p. A30). The fact that an
opinion-editorial by Vice President Cheney and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld “advocating
a pre-emptive strike against Iraq was recently pulled from The Washington Post at the
last minute because of fear at the White House that it might undermine the claim that Mr.
Bush had not decided the issue”, the growing perception that the president was using the
war on terrorism “as rhetorical cover” for a confrontational posture against Iraq, and the
failure of the administration to reveal its “ ‘bulletproof’ evidence of links between Al
Qaeda and Baghdad” were just some of the incidents cited by critics to buttress their
suspicion that the president was being “resolutely coy about a decision to go to war that
seems to have been made” already (Danner, 2002, p. A27; Jundt, 2002, p. WK11; “The
Illusory Prague Connection,” 2002, p. A22; Weisman, 2002, p. WK14). Even Times’
columnist Thomas L. Friedman, who was cautiously supportive of the strategic
underpinnings of the president’s policy towards Iraq, reported that the president’s
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leadership was being undermined by the growing suspicion that the president’s
aggressive stance and diplomatic stipulations towards Iraq were designed to make it
virtually impossible for Saddam Hussein to say yes to a diplomatic solution in a face
saving manner, thus the president through duplicitous means was perceived to be creating
a pretext for military action (2002b). In sum, there seemed to be a general sense within
this literature that the president’s policy towards Iraq bifurcated along a public tract that
emphasized collegiality, diplomacy, and dubious assertions regarding Iraq’s place in the
war on terrorism and a private tract that emphasized belligerency, unilateralism, and
militaristic proclivities, and the prevailing suspicion seemed to be that president’s public
efforts were primarily a means to put a more attractive face on a controversial yet
controlling private policy (Dowd, 2002c, 2002d; Kristof, 2002c).
Some elites believed that the president was antagonistic to collegial enterprises,
because he was more inclined to dictate or direct policy than debate or negotiate policy.
For instance, The Times’ columnist, Maureen Dowd, scoffed at the president’s
pretensions to collegial leadership, because she claimed that the president suffered from
an “alpha girl” mentality that caused the president to delude himself into believing that
“leadership was all about him” (2002d, p. A21). She believed that the president deep
down did not like “a lot meddling from know-nothings in Congress” on the Iraq issue
(2002b, p. 15). The president only “feigned interest in negotiation” in order to placate
members of Congress who expressed trepidation about military action against Iraq
(Dowd, 2002e, p. 13). In reality, Dowd (2002d) claimed that a duplicitous strategy
designed to undermine any potential diplomatic solution to the Iraqi threat was in the
works:
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Mr. Bush said he needed Congressional support to win at the U.N., but he wants
to fail at the U.N. so he can install his own MacArthur as viceroy of Iraq. (p. 13)
Dowd (2002c) went so far as to brazenly liken the president’s attitude towards
consultations with Congress and the Security Council to untoward chicanery by some
teens on prom night when she wrote:
As my girlfriend Dana said: “Bush is like the guy who reserves a hotel room and
then asks you to the prom.” (p. 13)
In other words, the debate about the proper course of action was academic, because the
president had already made up his mind. Dowd believed that there could be no doubt that
the president and the hawks within his administration were using diplomacy to create a
politically expedient pretext for the military invasion once the president began to move
sizeable numbers of troops to the Gulf region:
As the Pentagon moves troops, carriers, covert agents and B-2 bombers into the
Persian Gulf, the president, Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld continue
their pantomime of consultation. (2002c, p. 13)

The warriors gave a raspberry to the U.N., making it obvious that Mr. Bush was
just going through the multilateral motions by revealing that Gen. Tommy Franks
is moving the U.S. Central Command from Tampa to Qatar to get ready for a war
against Iraq. (2002b, p. 15)
Dowd was a part of a fairly large contingent of elites who expressed the view that
the president was manipulating the diplomatic process in order to manufacture “an excuse
to go war” that the American public, Congress, and the international community would
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regard as legitimate (“A Delicate Balance at the U.N., 2002, p. 12). Columnist Frank
Rich saw the president’s strategy towards consultations with Congress and the Security
Council as a replay of a previous duplicitous game plan where the president “would do
pretty much what he always intended after a few weeks of ostentatious
‘listening’”(2002a, p. A15). Columnist Bill Keller claimed the “consensus” view among
Russians was that “the Bush overtures to the U.N. are laughably insincere, a belated
effort to dress up an attack that is foreordained” (2002, p. A19). Jessica T. Mathews,
president of the Carnegie Endowment of Peace, and retired Air Force general Charles G.
Boyd predicted, “Soon the United States will declare the whole exercise [diplomatic
negotiations at the United Nations Security Council] a failure and invade Iraq” (2002, p.
A35).
Even on the doorstep of achieving a widely perceived diplomatic triumph at the
Security Council in the form of a tough new resolution (i.e. United Nations Resolution
1441) that demanded immediate Iraqi compliance with previous United Nations’
disarmament orders, a significant contingent elites shared the fear that the president’s
lack of faith in diplomacy as an ultimate solution would eventually “tempt” the president,
despite the potential consequences, to sabotage or prematurely jettison the diplomatic
process. In a column entitled Be Careful What You Ask For, Nicholas D. Kristof (2002b)
gave voice to this elite unease with the president’s belligerent proclivities and forewarned
his contemporaries of the national suffering that could potentially ensue from the
president’s shortsighted leadership when he wrote:
Mr. Bush’s problem is that he has launched a diplomatic process in which he has
little faith. The reality is that he went to the U.N. to get international legitimacy,
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not weapons inspection. So he may soon be tempted to short-circuit the
diplomatic process.
The resolution, as it is presently drafted, requires Saddam Hussein to make
a full declaration of his secret programs within 30 days. It’s a good bet that
there’ll be a lot of doubt that his declaration is completely truthful, and so hawks
will encourage Mr. Bush to launch a war at that time. . . .
If that happens, we could be at war by year’s end. We may be paying for
such hubris for years to come. (p. A31)
Dimension- Speculation Versus Empirical Documentation
The duplicity property attempts to capture the degree of disagreement or
dissonance that elites perceive between the president’s publicly articulated policy towards
Iraq and what was perceived to be his private or actual policy towards Iraq. The property
was dimensionalized along the basis of speculation versus empirical documentation. This
rating scale was based upon the assumption that an evaluating elite commentator
probably would have a higher degree of certainty about the president’s duplicity, if he or
she was willing cite or document specific demonstrations of presidential duplicity. This
rating scale was also based upon the assumption that this community of elites would
assign higher degrees of confidence and weight to observations by their colleagues that
could be empirically documented versus observations by their colleagues that amounted
to mere speculation, thus making perceptions based upon empirical documentation more
influential in the determination of the president’s professional reputation than perceptions
based primarily upon speculation.
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Given the inherently speculative nature of elite appraisals, one could argue that
the speculation/empirical documentation dichotomy is not a good way to dimensionalize
this property. However, this analyst would argue that the presence or absence of
empirical documentation fundamentally altered the nature of the appraisal, because
empirical documentation in comparison to undocumented speculation introduces more
stringent notions regarding the verification or falsification of data. Furthermore, the
empirical documentation designation includes appraisals that speculate at least to a
significant degree on the basis of empirical documentation, while the speculation
designation is reserved for appraisals that are totally or primarily based upon
undocumented speculation. Thus, judgments regarding appropriate designations for
appraisals were determined by the presence or absence of empirical documentation and
by the context in which the appraisal was embedded. With these caveats, this analyst
reasoned that the speculation/empirical dichotomy was a good way to differentiate or
dimensionalize this property along a substantive continuum.
If an elite commentator documented dissonance within the president’s policy with
specific references to evidence then this opinion was generally designated as empirical
documentation on the duplicity scale. Thus, when The Times’ columnist Maureen Dowd
referenced troop movements to the Gulf as evidence of the president’s insincere
“pantomime of consultation,” this excerpt was given a score of empirical documentation
on the duplicity scale (2002b, p. A21). If an elite commentator simply referenced
perceived dissonance in the president’s thinking or strategy about his policy, then this
opinion was generally rated as speculative on the duplicity scale. Thus, when The Times’
columnist Nicholas Kristof couched his speculation that the president “has launched a
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diplomatic process in which he has little faith” in language that is matter-of-fact but no
specific documentation is offered to buttress his speculation, the analyst for this study
believed that this example warranted a designation of speculation (2002b, p. A31).
Presidential Coercive Impatience
In the editorial entitled A Measured Pace on Iraq, which appeared in The Times
the day after the aforementioned The Iraq Test editorial, one detects a noticeable increase
in the skepticism directed at the president’s supposedly collegial approach to the Iraqi
threat based upon the perception of presidential impatience with the deliberations of his
interlocutors at the United Nations Security Council and Congress.
Mr. Bush was already sounding impatient yesterday, just a day after his address to
the U.N. Unless the president has evidence indicating that Iraq is on the brink of
fabricating nuclear weapons, he would be well advised to give the Security
Council and Congress ample time to deliberate. He will only undermine support
for his policy if he tries to stampede everyone into action.
(“A Measured Pace,” 2002, p. A14)
In the above excerpt, the president was warned about the potential negative ramifications
for his policy and leadership if his impatience persists, and in the closing paragraph of
this editorial, the warning was reiterated in distinctly more blunt language that also
introduced a veiled allusion to presidential coercion.
If he [the president] expects to gain domestic and foreign backing for dealing with
Iraq, he will need to treat Congress and the U.N. Security Council as partners and
not as mere compliant bodies that can be bludgeoned into acting.
(“A Measured Pace,” 2002, p. A14)
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In an editorial entitled The Road Map for Iraq for September 18, 2002 edition of
The Times, the president was characterized as “pressing the U.N. toward a showdown
with the Hussein regime” (2002, p. A30). The editorial also noted the president’s
skepticism of the deliberations at the Security Council regarding a new resolution against
Iraq, which in turn highlighted elite skepticism about the president’s commitment to a
collegial leadership on this controversial issue. The editorial also chastised the president
for his impatience with diplomacy and his coercive proclivities.
The Bush administration fears that sequential votes could lead to a stalemate, but
if Washington is serious about working with other nations to restrain Iraq, it
can’t expect to dictate every move to the U.N. (“The Road Map for Iraq,” 2002, p.
A30)
In an October 10, 2002 opinion-editorial entitled Congress Must Resist the Rush
to War, Democratic Senator from West Virginia, Robert C. Byrd, seemingly in a fit
exasperation condemned the Congress for abdicating its constitutional prerogatives and
responsibilities in the face of “absurd” presidential impatience and pressure, and thus, by
implication he seemingly was condemning the president for adopting an impatient and
antagonistic approach to Congress that was inimical to facilitating the “due deliberation”
regarding “the president’s use-of-force resolution” that the constitution required and
American people deserved:
How have we gotten to this low point in the history of Congress? Are we too
feeble to resist the demands of a president who is determined to bend the
collective will of Congress to his will . . . . And why are we allowing the
executive to rush our decision-making right before an election? Congress, under
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pressure from the executive branch, should not hand away its Constitutional
powers. (p. A39)
Dimension
The property of presidential coercive impatience achieved a high degree of
salience within collection of elite opinion writings. This property predominately was
couched in emphatic language that suggested a high degree of presidential coercive
impatience, and as result, the overall dimensional characterization for this collection of
elite writing was high presidential coercive impatience.
Partisan Demagoguery
The next property centers upon the concept of partisan demagoguery. Partisan
demagoguery was defined as the fervent advancement of mores, objectives, and ideals
associated with president’s agenda, ideology or party through strategies designed to
consolidate the president’s political position and “to foment political divisions” or
marginalization among the president’s rivals (Davidson & Oleszek, 2004, p. 187).
The editorial board of The Times made perhaps its most explicit rebuke of the
president’s leadership when it charged that the president was unabashedly contributing to
a corrosive atmosphere surrounding Congress’s deliberations regarding Iraq. In the
estimation of The Times, the president greatly undermined the legislature’s capacity to
honor its “solemn obligation in our constitutional system to weigh issues of war and
peace . . . as free from partisanship as possible” by calling the patriotism of dissenters
into question (“The Politics of War,” 2002, p. A26; “The Healthy Politics of Iraq,”
2002). In a seemingly selfish effort to gain “political advantage”, the president’s partisan
demagoguery not only negatively impinged upon the prerogatives of Congress but
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threaten to “severely damage the body politic” by taking a divide nation to war (“A
Nation Wary of War,” 2002, p. A30).
In an editorial entitled The Healthy Politics of Iraq, The Times’ editorial board
articulated a rather nuanced argument regarding presidential partisanship. Partisanship
itself was not necessarily corrosive to the debate, but presidential partisanship that
devolved into partisan demagoguery that sanctioned attacks against the patriotism or
integrity of skeptics who raise questions about the president’s stewardship of diplomatic
efforts or policy prescriptions represented a dereliction of presidential duty.
President Bush and the Democrats in Congress are suddenly in meltdown mode
over the issue of who is playing politics on the eve of a possible war with Iraq.
Mr. Bush has begun using the campaign against terrorism in his stump speeches,
declaring that Democrats are “not interested in the security of the American
people”. . . . None of this is unhealthy. We just wish all of this intensity was being
directed at the issue of Iraq instead of people’s political motives. . . .
. . . . The Bush administration has to recognize the legitimate concerns of
lawmakers who do not want to give the president a blank check to wage war
wherever he wants in a region and without any initial steps being taken to try to
avoid a conflict. Casting slurs on the patriotism of anyone who raises a question
is unfair and borders on un-American. (“The Healthy Politics of Iraq,” 2002, p.
A28)
The perception that the president irresponsibly questioned the patriotism of
dissenters was not confined to The Times’ editorial board. Columnist Frank Rich wrote,
“To question the president on Iraq is an invitation to have one’s patriotism
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besmirched”(2002a, p. A15). In an opinion-editorial entitled Defend the Country, Not the
Party, Democratic House minority leader Richard Gephardt expanded the critique by
arguing that presidential besmirchment of the patriotism of dissenters was part a
calculated and cynical campaign to market the war “to the G.O.P.’s advantage in the
2002 elections” (2002, p. A31). Essentially by rebuking the president for making
support or disagreement with the president’s Iraqi policy a referendum on a person’s
fitness for elective office and patriotism, Gephardt (2002) argued that the president’s
partisan demagoguery was not only distasteful but also potentially tragically shortsighted,
because the president’s partisan actions and divisive rhetoric were unnecessarily
undermining the bipartisan support essential to any long term resolution of the Iraqi
crisis:
President Bush himself has decided to play politics with the safety and security of
the American people. . . . he went so far as to say that the Democrat-led Senate is
“not interested in the security of the American people.”. . .
This is not how a great nation should debate issues of war and peace. To
question people’s patriotism for simply raising questions about how a war is to be
fought and won—to say that anybody who doesn’t support the president’s
particular policy on national security is against national security—is not only
insulting, it’s immoral. . . .
But the statements by the president and the vice president only serve to . . .
undermine trust and thwart cooperation. If Mr. Bush and his party continue to use
the war as a political weapon, our efforts to address the threat posed by Iraq will
fail (p. A31)
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Conceptually speaking, Gephardt and other elites who shared his views seemingly
insinuated that the president’s partisan demagoguery was not only distasteful and
shortsighted but also constituted a dereliction of presidential duty. The president’s
partisan demagoguery constituted an abdication of his responsibility to be a sober
constitutional officer who facilitates deliberative policymaking between the various
branches of government particularly regarding “issues of war and peace” (Gephardt,
2002, p. A31; Tulis, 1987).
Dimension
Within this population of writings, the president was repeatedly suspected or
accused of partisan antagonism towards political dissenters (“Germany Speaks,” 2002;
Krugman, 2002b; Rich, 2002b). Even when the president was seemingly pursuing policy
internally through institutional channels in Congress and the United Nations, his actions
were perceived to be marred by external tactics that seemed to be designed to pressure,
discredit or circumvent institutions like Congress and the United Nations by a significant
number of elites (Byrd, 2002; Gepherdt, 2002). As a result, the overall characterization
for this body of writings was scored as high on partisan demagoguery property.
Presidential Contempt Toward The Integrity & Prerogatives Of Congress & U.N.
Security Council
When this data was “constructed” into a narrative of interpretive abstraction in
order to deduce the conceptual meaning and significance of the properties of the second
major thematic pattern, a significant subcategory emerged (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). The
subcategory that emerged was the notion of presidential contempt for the integrity and
prerogatives of Congress and the Security Council as it related to deliberations over Iraq

89
policy, and this subcategory and in turn its parent overarching theme are defined by
properties such as presidential duplicity, presidential coercive impatience, and
presidential partisan demagoguery.
One of the strongest and most persuasive sentiments in this collection of elite
writings was the need for sober, patient, and thoughtful deliberation regarding the Iraqi
threat between the president, Congress, the U.N. Security Council, and the American
populace, and the quality of the president’s leadership would judged on whether his
leadership facilitated or undermined sober, patient, and thoughtful deliberations among
these groups. When one abstracts from the data in order to discern conceptual meaning
and significance, one gets the sense that this community of elites had constructed their
understanding of the Iraqi controversy within the confines of a bargaining society where
reciprocity, tolerance, and deliberation were the governing norms (Kernell, 1997; Strauss
& Corbin, 1998). In other words, if genuine and inclusive deliberation was to take place
among parties that have longstanding relationships with each other then each party had to
respect the integrity, prerogatives, sentiments, and interests of the other bargaining
partners. In the estimation of a significant number of elites within this population, the
president, despite prior presidential statements to the contrary, had established a
consistent record of enmity towards the norms of humility, tolerance, reciprocity, shared
responsibility, and deliberation across a wide range of domestic and foreign issues.
According to this expressed elite perspective, if the president was serious about
adopting a collegial approach to the Iraqi threat, he might have regarded “United Nations
as more than a distraction” given the fact that “for a lot of countries it [United Nations] is
the closest thing to feeling enfranchised in world affairs” (Keller, 2002, p. A19). Instead,
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the president was “treating it [United Nations] with undisguised petulance” (Keller, 2002,
p. A19). Thus, no one should be surprised that the international community perceives “a
certain degree of imperial contempt for the rest of the world . . . . oozing” from President
Bush’s deliberations at the United Nations (Friedman, 2002a, p. A27). In a column
entitled The Jack Welch War Plan, Columnist Frank Rich (2002b) argued that the
president’s longstanding record of contempt for the independent prerogatives of Congress
was analogous to the contempt some business chief executives demonstrated towards the
independent responsibilities and prerogatives of their respective corporate boards and this
presidential contempt was bound to be reflected in the president’s congressional relations
regarding Iraq:
. . . this presidency is all of one consistent piece, whether it is managing our
money or managing a war. Now, as pre-9/11, it reflects the C.E.O. ethos of the
1990’s bubble . . . . Two weeks before his inauguration, Mr. Bush invited Jack
Welch, Ken Lay and a bevy of C.E.O.’s down to Texas, and he has always run the
White House by the cardinal rules in their playbook. A chief executive can do no
wrong. The directors (for which read Republicans in Congress) and outside
directors (that would be the Democrats) are expected to give him a blank check
and question nothing. . . (p. A17)
Based upon this perceived pattern of past presidential disposition and behavior, Rich
(2002b) anticipated to his chagrin that the president will continue to exemplify a
contemptuous disposition towards Congress even though this model of leadership had
been “discredited”:
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Now that we know that this model was a sham . . . you would think the Bush
Administration might revisit it. But instead it is following a discredited modus
operandi more slavishly than ever, even as it prepares to fight a new war.
(p. A17)
Thus, once again the data seemingly confirm Neustadt’s (1990) contention that a
president’s professional reputation is largely based upon retrospective perceptions of
perceived patterns in past presidential disposition and behavior. In this case, the above
quotations give voice to an emerging sentiment among elites that given the president’s
track record it is reasonably to suspect that the president felt contempt towards the
prerogatives of Congress and the United Nations, and as result of this contempt, there
was considerable suspicion about the sincerity of the president’s commitment to collegial
diplomacy as a means to “exhaust peaceful approaches before advocating war”(“Testing
Iraq on Arms Inspectors,” 2002, p. A30).
In sum, the prevailing sentiment of these elites put forth the notion that the
president’s leadership style or approach was critical to determining the ultimate policy
outcome. A clear majority believed that all diplomatic measures should be exhausted
before resorting to war. The prevailing belief among these elites was that collegiality by
the president was essential to facilitating the type of deliberation, consensus, and
collaboration necessary for diplomatic success. Demonstrations of presidential
leadership that were perceived to be inimical to diplomatic success were ridiculed and
engendered skepticism about the president’s commitment and capacity to resolve the
Iraqi threat peacefully. The president’s professional reputation suffered as a result.
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Chapter 6
Discussion
Conceptual Significance Of Overarching Theme
The overarching thematic pattern that emerged from this population of opinion
writings in The New York Times was following: The president made a “forceful” case that
Iraq was governed by a rogue regime that possessed illegal stockpiles of weapons of mass
destruction in his speech to the United Nations on September 12, 2002 and in subsequent
statements, but the president failed to make a strong evidentiary case that the Iraqi regime
was an imminent threat that warranted the president’s perceived policy preference of
immediate preemptive military action.
Based upon the evidence and reasoning showcased in the president’s threat
assessment, the president misdiagnosed the Iraqi threat. He also mischaracterized the
nature of the Iraqi threat by attributing a level of urgency to it that was unwarranted. The
president seemingly failed to recognize or acknowledge the possible unintended
consequences that might be unleashed by a premature move to war. In light of these
deficiencies, the president’s recommendation or policy prescription of war against Iraq
was unjustified. The president’s recommendation of war is not only premature but also
dangerously reckless and irresponsible. Taken altogether, this population of political
elites seemingly had negative orientation towards the president’s professional reputation
as it related to his stewardship of Iraq policy in the fall of 2002.
The analytical or conceptual significance of this pervasive sentiment towards the
president’s professional reputation regarding his stewardship of U.S. policy towards Iraq
in fall of 2002 is three-fold.
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First, a close examination of the data seems to reveal implicit suggestions of
presidential incompetence as it related to the threat posed by Iraq. The idea being that the
president demonstrated a serious lack of understanding of the multifaceted nature of the
Iraqi issue. For example, there were serious and widespread misgivings about how the
president analyzed and characterized the threat from Iraq. There seemed to be a
consensus view among elites that the evidentiary premises of the president’s ideological
policy analysis were dubious at best, and presidential reasoning that was derived from
those questionable premises was seriously and dangerously flawed. Why was the
president erroneously suggesting that the threats from Saddam and Al Qaeda were
actually one and the same (Benjamin, 2002)? Why did the president seemingly lack an
appreciation for the potential pitfalls, ramifications, and uncertainties of war (Herbert,
2002; Kristof, 2002)? There was considerable unease about the possibility that Iraq was
distracting the president from more pressing threats like Al Qaeda (Albright, 2002; “Iraqi
Chessboard,” 2002; Jundt, 2002).
Second, the data suggests that this community of political elites believed or was
beginning to believe that the president’s policy argumentation was not simply flawed,
misguided, or disingenuous but rather constituted a dereliction of presidential duty that
unnecessarily imperiled the nation’s international prestige, security, and future prospects.
Mark Danner, a contributor to The New Yorker magazine and a faculty member at the
University of California at Berkeley, wrote an opinion-editorial entitled The Struggles of
Democracy & Empire (2002) where he blamed the president’s duplicitous policy
argumentation for facilitating a false and ill-formed national debate regarding Iraq:

94
In promoting the Iraq expedition as a necessary response to an immediate terrorist
threat, however, they [the Bush Administration] have failed to prepare the
American public for what looks to be a long and costly engagement in the Middle
East. Much of the confusion surrounding the Iraq debate thus far is owed to the
justifications proffered and the more elaborate geopolitical enterprise motivating
many in the Bush administration. (p. A27)
Danner’s remarks touched on a seemingly growing suspicion, even at this early
stage of the controversy, that the president was irresponsibly manipulating the data and
the national debate in order to surreptitiously advance an ulterior political agenda (Dowd,
2002a; Krugman, 2002a, 2002b). Even though it was only in its embryonic phases, the
mere insinuation that the president of the United States was peddling “false data”
involving national security and regarded “facts as malleable” in order to support his
shifting rationales on Iraq policy, is a serious condemnation of presidential character,
particularly in the post-9/11 era, and a early warning sign of the fragile state of the
president’s standing within the political establishment (Krugman, 2002b, p. A35; Rich,
2002a, p. A15). The fact that these types of insidious insinuations emerged rather early
in the time frame of this study suggests that contextual factors prior and surrounding the
scope of this study were having an impact the president’s professional reputation
regarding Iraq.
Danner (2002) indicted the president’s leadership for the clouds of suspicion
hovering over his policy and for irresponsibly embarking an ill-prepared and divided
nation on an audacious and treacherous adventure in Iraq:
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Thus far, he [President Bush] has abdicated his responsibility to build the political
support he will need to shape Iraq, and the Middle East, that will follow Saddam
Hussein.
For America, the great risk of this new crusade is that the political will
might be lacking to carry it out – that the public, unprepared for the imperial
ambitions about to play out in the Middle East, will quickly lose heart if the
project comes to grief; that after the inevitable setbacks and perhaps after further
attacks at home, the occupation will grow unpopular and that even those in the
administration whose vision is not so ambitious will want to cut and run, leaving
ruin once more in America’s wake. (p. A27)
John Dower (2002) who won a Pulitzer Prize for a book that documented
America’s occupation of Japan after the Second World War noted in an opinion-editorial
entitled Lessons From Japan About War’s Aftermath that the president’s attempts to
analogize his policy towards Iraq with America’s successful defeat and occupation of
Japan revealed not only a lack of understanding of history and a failure to fully
appreciate the complexity and range of potential consequences associated with a military
conquest and occupation of Iraq but also a kind of hubris that would cause the president
to imperil the nation’s security through overreach.
Third, the widespread unease and skepticism towards the president’s stewardship
of Iraq policy within this population of elite opinion writings was an early indication that
many elites were inclined to challenge rather than support the president in the event that
he went forward with his policy of preemptive war and experienced difficulties. One
would think that the pervasiveness of this skepticism regarding his leadership would have
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ignited presidential concern as he embarked upon his controversial policy and created
major incentives for presidential rapprochement with the political establishment given the
fact that squabbling amongst mainstream elites over a controversial and salient
presidential policy dramatically increases the likelihood that the president and his policy
will receive unfavorable press, which could serve as a catalyst for public dissatisfaction
with his policy (DeClerico, 2000; McCartney, 1994; Perloff, 1998). In a future study,
one might investigate whether the administration actually had these concerns, and if so,
what were their strategies to address them.
Second Major Theme
The conceptual name of the second thematic category was elite skepticism of
presidential commitment. This category signified the considerable amount of elite
skepticism regarding the authenticity of the president’s commitment to pursue a peaceful
resolution to the Iraqi threat through collegial consultations with Congress and the United
Nations Security Council before resorting to armed conflict. In fact, a significant
segment of elites gradually seemed to have coalesced around the suspicion that the
president’s ulterior motivation for collegial enterprises with Congress and the Security
Council was to obtain politically expedient legitimacy for a virtually preordained armed
invasion against Iraq (Kristof, 2002b). The defining properties of this thematic category
were presidential duplicity, presidential coercive impatience, presidential partisan
demagoguery, and presidential contempt.
The conceptual significance of this discovery is that it seemingly lends credence
to the contention that many contemporary dilemmas in presidential leadership are the
result of the contradictory fault lines in the political development of the presidency
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(Tulis, 1998). The modern president is expected despite inherent contradictions to
seamlessly oscillate between the roles of an energetic proponent of presidential
prerogative and power through the formulation, promotion, and implementation of a
partisan policy agenda and a sober and mostly unpartisan facilitator of deliberative
policymaking amongst various constitutionally recognized policymakers (Tulis, 1984,
1987, 1996).
In the case of the Iraqi controversy, President Bush’s previous conduct as an
energetic and partisan advocate for presidential prerogative and power in routine
domestic and international affairs seemingly undercut some elites’ capacity to accept him
as a sober and trustworthy vanguard of the national interest in the Iraqi crisis. The lack of
trust in the president’s publicly stated commitment to collegial leadership was fueled in
part by perceived hints of militaristic ulterior motives and a perceived presidential
proclivity to use the Iraqi controversy for electoral advantage (“A Delicate Balance at the
U.N.,” 2002; Rich, 2002b; “The Healthy Politics of Iraq,” 2002). The data also suggests
that some elites possibly feared that the president would irresponsibly use their support of
his leadership on the Iraqi controversy as a means to consolidate the president’s
dominance in other more routine policy matters (Krugman, 2002a). Professional
reputation may be a fruitful window into exploring the consequences of the presidency’s
competing leadership orientations.
Reputation Influenced By Perceptions Of Previous Presidential Performance
Neustadt argued that constitutional structure and the contextual features of the
political environment in which the president operates typically compel the president to
collaborate with multiple institutions and constituencies in order to formulate, enact, and
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implement policy, and he also observed that presidents must be aware of the potential
costs of unilateral action to presidential power and reputation even in policy domains
where the president seemingly has considerable constitutional authority to pursue his own
policy preferences without external constraint (1990).
On top of that, Neustadt claimed that the president must always be cognizant of
the fact that elites who monitor or do business with the president constantly look for
patterns in presidential behavior in an effort to accurately forecast future presidential
performance, and these retrospective appraisals of presidential temperament and skill
help elites make appropriate moves to secure their interests and policy preferences vis-àvis the president (1990).
A close reading of these opinion pieces suggests that elite perceptions of President
Bush’s stewardship of Iraq policy were made in part through the prism of past
presidential performance. To their chagrin, some elites thought they saw signs of
duplicity, coercive impatience, partisan demagoguery, and contempt in the president’s
current overtures to the Security Council and Congress regarding Iraq that were similar to
previous or related action by the president. Even at risk of attracting the ire of the
president and his associates, some of these elites deemed that it was in their interest to
disseminate their suspicions of the president to a wider community. The fact that
President Bush’s professional reputation seemingly was negatively impacted to a
significant degree by elite suspicions regarding the president’s overtures to the Security
Council and Congress gives preliminary credence to the existence of a retrospective
dimension in Neustadt’s professional reputation concept.
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Elite Orientation To President Bush’s Policy Argumentation
In a work entitled All the President’s Words: The Bully Pulpit and the Creation of
the Virtual Presidency, Carol Gelderman observed that to a significant degree
presidential “policy is made by words . . . and words shape thought” (1997, p. 37). The
content within this collection of elite opinion writings regarding the president’s
stewardship of Iraq policy during this initial phase of this public controversy indicated
that the collective thought of these elites was as much a reaction to the president’s policy
argumentation as it was to the president’s actions. In fact given the privileged status that
this collection of elites seemingly attributed to the president’s rhetoric, which was in
accordance with many contemporary scholastic perspectives regarding the nature and
management of the presidency, one’s analysis of elite perceptions regarding this
president’s acumen over Iraq policy might benefit from the understanding that these elites
seemed to conceptualize the president’s policy argumentation as “commensurate with
action” (Hart, 1984, 1987; Waterman, Wright & St. Clair, 1999, p. 66). This conceptual
insight as a means of achieving a deeper understanding of elite opinion regarding the
professional reputation of President Bush seems all the more compelling when one
considers that the dominant theme that emerged from this collection writings was related
directly to the president’s speechmaking. This elite emphasis on the president’s
management of discourse as a critical criterion in their assessment of the president’s
professional reputation suggests that theories related to the intersection of presidential
discourse, leadership, and constituency feedback might provide fruitful insight into the
meaning and significance of the thematic patterns that emerged from the collection of
elite writings investigated for this study.
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The thematic sentiments expressed within this collection of elite opinion writings
suggest that the dilapidated state of President Bush’s professional reputation as it related
to his stewardship of Iraq policy could partly be the function of the polity’s convoluted,
layered, and often contradictory orientations towards presidential leadership particularly
as it pertains to presidential crisis discourse (Tulis, 1987). According to the rhetorical
presidency theory articulated by Jeffrey Tulis, the occupant of the modern presidency is
expected, if he or she is to be regarded as a strong and vigorous leader, “to inspirit the
nation” through the virtually constant use of popular (i.e. rhetoric meant for public
consumption rather than simply rhetoric that has mass appeal) rhetoric particularly
regarding public controversies of great national concern (Tulis, 1984, p. 100). In a piece
entitled The Decay of Presidential Rhetoric, Tulis noted,
Since the presidencies of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson popular or
mass rhetoric has become a principal tool of presidential governance and the
doctrine that a president ought to be a popular leader has become an unquestioned
premise of our political culture. Indeed, far from questioning popular leadership,
intellectuals and columnists have embraced the concept and appear to be
constantly calling for more or better presidential leadership of popular opinion
(1984, p. 99).
Yet, the modern presidency is also expected to honor one of the lasting yet often
unacknowledged legacies of the Founding Fathers, which socialized succeeding
generations of Americans through constitutional construction, institutional practice, and
political tradition into adopting the perception of the president as a constitutional officer
who is averse to popular opinion leadership and judiciously uses discourse to facilitate
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deliberative and responsible policymaking between the executive and legislative branches
of government (Tulis, 1984, 1987).
In an elaboration of the tenets of rhetorical presidency theory, a significant
segment of elites in their opinion writings regarding the president’s stewardship of Iraq
policy seemingly recommended that President Bush adopt a model of leadership that
somehow stirred, informed and managed public opinion and simultaneously insulated
governmental leaders from public pressure that might undermine deliberation and
responsible policymaking. This sentiment seemingly failed to fully recognize or
appreciate the difficulties in reconciling these seemingly contradictory aspirations,
orientations, and modalities into a newly transcendent and principled form of presidential
rhetorical leadership particularly given the rise of individual pluralism, political
polarization, and mass media proliferation in the surrounding political environment
(Tulis, 1996; Kernell, 1997). Furthermore, if one accepts the existence and pervasiveness
of this conflicted orientation towards presidential policy argumentation and the
contextual developments that seemingly exacerbate internal tensions within that
conflicted orientation, as suggested by rhetorical presidency theory, one might
hypothesize that generally speaking the professional reputation of presidents regarding
controversial issues like Iraq policy is likely to be held in low regard, which in turn could
have significant and long lasting effects on the prestige and operation of presidential
leadership.
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Chapter 7
Future Study
Neustadt argued that the “echoes” of the president’s professional reputation could
be heard in the columns of men like Krock and Reston who happened to write for The
New York Times, and so based upon the criteria established by the author of the
professional reputation concept, this study decided to use opinion pieces from The New
York Times as its measure (1990, p. 53). However, in an effort to alleviate concerns of
ideological and geographical bias, a future researcher who is interested in investigating
professional reputation might want to draw his sample of writings from a cross section of
national newspapers.
The general goal of this study was to determine elite perceptions of President
Bush’s stewardship of Iraq policy in the fall of 2002 through qualitative thematic
analysis. However, since this study was based entirely upon analysis of documents,
analytical judgments regarding those elite perceptions can only be inferred from the data
without the benefit crosschecking the veracity of those analytical judgments through
interviews with the participants. A future study based, at least in part, upon in-depth
interviews with the opinion writers could potentially give us much greater insight into
their appraisals of the president.
Neustadt contends, “Reputation, of itself, does not persuade, but it makes
persuasion easier, or harder, or impossible” (1990, p. 53). This study seems to indicate
that elites had a negative view of President Bush’s professional reputation as it related to
initial phase of his stewardship of Iraq policy in the fall of 2002, yet the president was
able to successfully move forward with the enactment of his policy preferences. An
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potentially interesting research question for a future study would be why was the
president, with a weak or negative professional reputation, able to secure at the
conclusion of the initial phase (as specified by the time period this study) of Iraq
controversy a congressional resolution that essentially authorized him to use force against
Iraq at his own discretion and the controversial and internationally resisted U.N. Security
Council Resolution 1441, which was an ultimatum from the Security Council of the
United Nations to Saddam to disclose his WMD program and disarm or “face the severest
consequences”(Bush, 2002e, para. 1; Purdum, 2003)? Furthermore, in order to get a
deeper understanding of professional reputation and its importance, we need to design
future studies that attempt to precisely measure professional reputation’s impact upon
policy. More studies should build upon the work of Lockerbie and Borrelli who
attempted to measure how perceptions of presidential skill impacted congressional roll
call votes (1989).
Additional study is needed to more definitively determine whether or not elite
perceptions of professional reputation are routinely and significantly impacted by a
pervasive and conflicted orientation towards presidential policy argumentation, as
suggested by rhetorical presidency theory.
The perceptions regarding President Bush’s professional reputation seemed to be
rooted in large part in the idea that the president was derelict in the performance of his
presidential duties. One might consider the president’s “dereliction of duty” to be a
prime consequence of the tension created by the “layered” political development of the
presidency whereby the contemporary political environment superimposes expectations
of vigorous presidential stewardship of a partisan policy agenda onto the presidency’s
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institutional structure and founding mores, which traditionally instructs the president to
emphasize his or her role as a deliberative and relatively unpartisan facilitator of policy
(Tulis, 1996, 1998). If one accepts Tulis’ argument, then perhaps the perceived
shortcomings of President Bush’s professional reputation were more the result of
structural contradictions within the political environment and the institutional presidency
than the result of personal deficiencies in leadership capacity on the part of the president.
If a future researcher would like to study the professional reputation concept qualitatively
through the case study format similar to the one utilized for the current study, the
significance and meaning of the findings could be greatly enhanced by a more refined
and disciplined explication of the surrounding contextual variables and dimensions,
which would increase the likelihood of a more precise determination regarding the
salience and impact of structural or environmental variables to elite perceptions of
presidential reputation. A richer explication of the surrounding context in which the
investigated controversy is embedded may give the analyst greater insight into how much
weight elites assign to personal qualities versus contextual factors in their evaluations of
a president’s professional reputation.
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Table 1: Major Thematic Categories
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Property

policy

Ideology

Property
Evidence

argumentation

Property
unintended
consequences

elite skepticism of

Presidential

presidential coercive

partisan

presidential

duplicity

impatience

demagoguery

commitment to
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